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Since 1974 the Aegean Sea has been a topic of much dispute for Greece and 
Turkey.  In spite of many attempts to resolve the problems, the dispute goes on to this 
day.  Over the years it has cost both countries some lives, cost Greece and Turkey 
politically and economically, and has been a detriment to NATO defense planning and 
operations.  Continued tensions therefore not only hold the potential for disastrous war 
between two members of the same alliance but also hold the potential to pull other 
countries into this conflict.   
Stability in the region and, consequently, Europe is therefore at risk and must be 
restored through resolution of these disputes between Greece and Turkey.  Resolution has 
not been attained, though, mainly because of each countrys intense nationalism and 
pervasive mistrust of the other country.  This nationalism and mistrust of the other 
country must be overcome if a resolution is to be reached.  Fortunately, the current 
governments of both Greece and Turkey are much more moderate and pro-resolution than 
their predecessors, and an ironic amelioration of relations thanks to devastating 
earthquakes in both Greece and Turkey in 1999 indicate that the time is ripe for a push 
toward resolution. 
This thesis therefore examines the Aegean dispute in detail, shows its impact on 
NATO, looks at the attempts at resolution over the past thirty years, and discusses the 
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Since 1974 the Aegean Sea has been a topic of much dispute for Greece and 
Turkey.  These two countries have been and still are quarrelling over delimitation (or 
assigning boundaries) of the continental shelf and, therefore, rights to any natural 
resources in the continental shelf, the breadth of territorial waters, control of the Aegean 
airspace, demilitarization/militarization of eastern Aegean islands, and ownership of 
various islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean.  In spite of many attempts to resolve the 
problems, the dispute goes on to this day.  Over the years it has cost both countries some 
lives, cost Greece and Turkey politically and economically, and has caused both countries 
to live at unnecessarily high states of tension and military readiness.  Continued tensions 
therefore not only hold the potential for disastrous war between two members of the same 
alliance but also hold the potential to pull other countries into this conflict.   
The dispute has also been a detriment to NATO defense planning and operations.  
Not only did Greece withdraw from NATOs integrated military structure from 1974-
1980, but Greek and Turkish disparity brought confusion, delay, and deadlock to NATO 
budgetary and logistical planning and operations as well as to approval of the 1992 
command structure.  NATOs operational readiness and efficiency, especially in the 
southeastern sector, were consequently far less than they should have been. 
Stability in the Aegean region and, consequently, Europe is therefore at risk and 
must be restored through resolution of these disputes between Greece and Turkey.  
Resolution has not been attained, though, mainly because of each countrys intense 
nationalism and pervasive mistrust of the other country.  This nationalism and mistrust of 
 xii
the other country has prevented both parties from making a resolute, dedicated effort to 
solve the dispute and must be overcome if a resolution is to be reached.  Fortunately, the 
current governments of both Greece and Turkey, though, are much more moderate and 
pro-resolution than their predecessors, and an ironic amelioration of relations thanks to 
devastating earthquakes in both Greece and Turkey in 1999 indicate that the time is ripe 
for a push toward resolution. 
This thesis therefore examines the Aegean dispute in detail, shows its impact on 
NATO, and looks at the attempts at resolution over the past thirty years.  It concludes by 
discussing several factors that indicate, in spite of each countrys nationalism, that the 








 For centuries, relations between Greeks and Turks, and subsequently between 
their nation-states Greece and Turkey, have been tumultuous.  Periods of peace have 
existed, yet many more periods of conflict have dominated their affairs.  Notwithstanding 
a period of relative harmony between these countries from the late 1920s into the 
1950s, the last century, and especially since 1974, has been marred by mistrust, anger, 
hatred, threats of war, and even actual fighting.  The disputes rage over two separate yet 
related topics: 1.) Cyprus and 2.) the Aegean Sea.  For complete resolution of the rift 
between Greece and Turkey the Cyprus issue must be solved in conjunction with the 
problems in the Aegean; a rise in tensions or an unpleasant incident in one subsequently 
hardens attitudes in the other.  The disputes in the Aegean Sea are, though, quite 
complicated by themselves and will be the focus of this thesis.  These disputes have 
caused the unnecessary buildup of army and navy forces over the years and have even 
caused threats of war to be made, sporadically resulting in short-lived incidents of armed 
fighting.  They have also caused the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of 
which both countries are members, to operate less effectively and efficiently than it 
should have.  The disputes therefore not only hold the potential for disastrous war 
between two members of the same alliance but also hold the potential to pull other 
countries into this conflict.  Stability in the region and, consequently, Europe as a whole, 
is therefore at risk and must be restored through resolution of these disputes between 
Greece and Turkey. 
2 
The Aegean dispute is centered on several main issues: 1.) delimitation (or 
assigning boundaries) of the continental shelf and, therefore, rights to any natural 
resources in the continental shelf, 2.) the breadth of territorial waters, 3.) control of the 
Aegean airspace, 4.) demilitarization/militarization of eastern Aegean islands, and 5.) 
ownership of various islands, islets, and rocks in the Aegean.1  All are separate disputes 
but at the same time inter-related.  Though this thesis will discuss each dispute separately 
it is practically impossible to solve one of the problems without also solving the others at 
the same time.   
It is important to resolve these disputes in the Aegean in the near future for many 
reasons that are discussed throughout this thesis.  Recent negotiations and warming 
relations have been encouraging, yet the negotiations are still limited in scope and short 
in duration.  Throughout the thirty years of the recent conflict and including current 
negotiations, one major factor has stymied the resolution process.  This major factor is 
national pride coupled with a pervasive mistrust of the other country.  Both countries 
must overcome this powerful psychological barrier; if not, the conflict will fester forever. 
This thesis will cover a brief history of the modern conflict and then discuss, in 
Chapter II, each dispute in detail.  Chapter III will show the impact that the overall 
dispute has had on NATO, and Chapter IV will summarize the many attempts to resolve 
the disputes.  To conclude the thesis, Chapter V will reflect upon the main obstacle to 
resolution and then discuss the prospects for resolution. 
                                                 
1 Turkish-Greek Relations, Aegean Problems.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.  [HTTP] Available: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adea/default.htm  [12 September 2000]. 
3 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
The history of relations between the two nations and countries goes back 
centuries.  It is a history full of wars, injustices, suspicion, and hatred based on 
differences in religion, ethnicity, culture, and politics.  Memories of this tumultuous 
history have undoubtedly influenced contemporary Greeks and Turks; though these 
memories are not among the root causes of the five Aegean disputes discussed in this 
thesis, they heavily contribute to the main obstacle impeding resolution, nationalism and 
a mistrust of the other country.   
The current dispute really has its origins in the Treaty of Lausanne.  This Treaty 
ended the Greek-Turkish fighting of the early 1920s that had erupted when World War I 
settlements took territory from Turkey and placed her under Allied control.  In spite of 
her significant postwar territorial gains, Greece additionally invaded the Anatolian coast 
and tried to conquer Smyrna (now Izmir, Turkey); Turkey fought against these attempts 
and at the same time fought for her independence from the occupying Allied powers.  
Signed in 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne ensured independence of the Turkish territories; 
it also established the Aegean status quo and a delicate balance between Turkey and 
Greece by harmonizing the vital interests and legitimate rights of both countries including 
those in the Aegean Sea.  The basic thinking of the Lausanne Treaty was to grant limited 
areas of maritime jurisdiction to the coastal states and leave the remaining parts of the 
Aegean to the common benefit of Turkey and Greece.2  Its edicts provided equity 
between the countries.  It gave sovereignty of the Aegean islands, except for Gökçeada 
and Bozcaada (which guard the entrance to the Turkish Dardanelles) and except for the 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
4 
Dodecanese islands (a group of 12 islands off the southwestern Anatolian coast owned at 
this time by Italy), to Greece.  [See Figure 1.]  It appeased Turkey, though, by ensuring 
various levels of demilitarization of the Greek islands near the Turkish coastline.  The 
Treaty also tried to resolve the controversial and painful issue of Greek and Turkish 
 
 
Figure 1. The Aegean Sea.  From The University of Texas at Austin Library, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/europe/Greece_rel96.jpg.    
 
5 
minorities and helped to ease this still ongoing source of conflict from the two countries.3  
In sum, it provided a fairly stable regime that helped maintain peace for the next several 
decades and remained uncontested until the debate over the continental shelf became 
important.   
The Treaty of Paris of 1947 (the peace treaty between Italy and the Allies, 
including Greece) further delineated the owner of various Aegean areas.  It gave Greece 
ownership of the Dodecanese islands, again with limits on the level of militarization.  The 
Dodecaneses had been Turkish since the sixteenth century and Italian since the Italian-
Turkish war of 1912.  The Treaty of Lausanne had in fact confirmed the Italian 
ownership of these islands in 1923 and was therefore superseded in this regard by the 
Treaty of Paris.  Between 1912 and 1947 the Dodecaneses therefore had served as a sort 
of buffer zone between Greece and Turkey, and the Treaty of Paris upset the balance that 
this brought.4  (These islands, with a large Greek population, were given to Greece in 
compensation for her sufferings in World War II; Turkey, a neutral in the War, was in no 
position to obstruct the transfer even if she had wished to do so.5) 
A period of relative peace from 1923 until the 1950s ensued.  World War II and 
the Cold War aided this peace, which, with both countries under a threat (or perceived 
threat) from Germany and Italy and the Soviet Union, respectively, caused greater 
political and military cooperation and caused both countries to join NATO.  In addition, 
                                                 
3 Though not discussed in detail in this thesis, the harsh treatment over the centuries of Greek ethnic 
minorities by Turkey and Turkish ethnic minorities by Greece plays a large role in the nationalism and 
feelings of mistrust of the other country of today.  Any resolution to the Greek-Turkish dispute must 
understand the role these hardships have played in each countrys history and take the lingering problems 
into consideration so they do not remain outstanding. 
4 Isles Torn by Geography and Politics, The Guardian (London), p. 18, 10 February 1996. 
5 Wilson, Andrew, The Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Paper No. 155, The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, p. 3, Dorking, Great Britain, Bartholomew Press, 1979. 
6 
the two early leaders, Eleftherios Venizelos of Greece and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of 
Turkey, were committed to détente.  The relative peace diminished, though, when ethnic 
violence reappeared in the mid-1950s and national priorities overtook the need for 
common defense.  Anti-Greek riots in 1955 in Istanbul typified this ethnic tension.  The 
ethnic tension was especially intense in Cyprus, where a delicate balance of bicommunal 
Greek/Turkish living existed first under British rule and later under an independent 
government.  Relative peace was restored through the early 1960s, but tensions 
continued throughout the rest of the decade (and still continue today).  When a rightist 
Greek group that was supported by the military dictatorship in Greece tried to take over 
the island in 1974, the Turkish government invoked its guarantor role and invaded the 
northern part of the island, taking over almost forty percent of the land and invoking cries 
of outrage from Greece.6   
Though, as will be seen in Chapter II, the related conflicts in the Aegean started in 
November 1973, the Cyprus invasion in 1974 really caused the simmering tensions to 
explode into the sometimes-violent conflict that has persisted until today.  The Aegean 
dispute therefore subsequently developed and grew more and more intense as tensions 
increased from the Cyprus debacle.   
Additionally, in 1982 after a decade of work, most of the worlds countries signed 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) creating the 
body of work that still governs the majority of the world maritime regime.  The signers, 
after much compromise, agreed upon such varied topics as pollution control and 
                                                 
6 Wilkinson, M. James, Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention to Reconciliation: Tackling Greek-Turkish 
Hostility, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, p. 9, Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, June 1999. 
7 
economic exclusion zones that prior to the signing had not been uniform around the 
world and thus had been under much dispute between the worlds capitals.  Others, such 
as the breadth of territorial waters, ownership of continental shelf, and control of 
airspace, were directly relevant to the dispute in the Aegean Sea.  Greece signed and 
ratified UNCLOS III, but even after it was finalized Turkey did not agree with many of 
the regimes that UNCLOS III set up.  Turkey therefore did not (and has not to this day) 
sign UNCLOS III and her opposition to many of the facets of UNCLOS III has been 
another root cause of the rift between Greece and Turkey.   
Finally, tensions between the countries further increased at the end of the Cold 
War.  During the Cold War, the existence of a common enemy caused Greece and 
Turkey, in spite of their long history of differences, to work together for their common 
defense.  Since there was no longer this common enemy after 1989, both sides could now 
more actively pursue their own individual objectives, which caused them to stray apart 
and caused tensions to further increase. 
The Treaty of Lausanne, Treaty of Paris, and UNCLOS III, which together 
established the existing status quo in the Aegean, were thus the major roots of the 
festering conflict between the countries throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s; the 
regimes that they established in the Aegean were sometimes unclear and sometimes 
contradictory.  The dispute over these regimes is to this day yet to be settled.  The actual 
conflicts have two sides: the Greek and the Turkish.  Many of the arguments of each side 
are understandably in their national interests while other arguments are more petty and 
undermining to the resolution process.  It is important to understand the details of these 
8 

















The root of the problem involves the delineation of sovereign rights and 
boundaries in the Aegean Sea, a problem that is extremely complex.  The geography of 
the area is complicated and does not provide for an easy answer.  The Aegean Sea is an 
irregularly shaped semi-enclosed sea of about 80,000 square miles (which is smaller in 
surface area than the North American Great Lakes)7 surrounded on the north and west by 
Greece and on the east by Turkey.  The Greek island of Crete bounds the Aegean to the 
south, leaving only narrow accesses between the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea.  The 
Aegean also provides the only high seas8 access from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea 
via the Dardanelles.  Nearly 2400 Greek islands, plus many Turkish islands, are situated 
throughout its length, complicating the delimitation of maritime boundaries.  The 
population makeup of many of these islands further complicates the problem; many 
Greeks live on islands very near the Turkish coastline and are nationally oriented to 
Greece, and Turkey feels that this close proximity could pose a threat to her homeland. 
To begin with, Turkey and Greece think of the Aegean dispute in very different 
general terms.  Of course, each side believes that the other is responsible for the disputes.  
Greece has a legalistic view and regards international law as the prevailing factor in the 
disputes.  She thinks of the Aegean as (for the most part) a Greek sea and regards Turkey 
as following an aggressive policy that contests Greek sovereignty and sovereign rights as 
                                                 
7 Stearns, Monteagle, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, p. 131, Council 
on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1992. 
8 Throughout this thesis, the term high seas will refer to the internationally accepted definition according 
to UNCLOS III, that being waters beyond a states territorial waters (thus international waters). 
10 
well as the legal status quo in the Aegean.9  The status quo of the Lausanne Treaty has, 
she believes, been somewhat changed because of subsequent agreements and treaties, and 
Turkey is ignoring the fundamental provisions of international law in making her 
unilateral claims.   
Turkey, on the other hand, believes that the Aegean (including the sea, airspace, 
and continental shelf) is a common entity that should be shared equally between the two 
countries and that both countries should respect each others vital interests.  Resolution of 
the disputes should be made with regard to the political, economic, and strategic interests 
of both countries and not based purely on international law.  She believes in the freedoms 
of the high seas and the air space above it and that any acquisition of new maritime areas 
should be fair and equitable and should be based on mutual consent.10  In essence, Turkey 
still believes in the Lausanne status quo, where both countries as Aegean nations have 
equally limited maritime jurisdiction and the rest of the Sea is for mutual use.  The 
Lausanne equity, Turkey says, should still be the driving guideline in solving the disputes 
in the Aegean and not necessarily, because the Aegean is a special case, the strict rules of 
international law.11  Turkey believes that Greece regards the Aegean as a Greek sea.  
Turkey also believes that Greece is trying to undermine Turkish security by controlling 
                                                 
9 Greek-Turkish relations.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece.  [HTTP] Available: 
http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/bilateral/relations.htm [18 September 2000]. 
10 Turkish-Greek Relations, Aegean Problems.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.  [HTTP] Available: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adea/default.htm  [12 September 2000]. 
11 These rules of international law are now in some cases different from the Lausanne equity.  For example, 
the Lausanne Treaty (nor the Treaty of Montreux or Treaty of Paris) did not discuss delineation of 
territorial waters, whereas now UNCLOS III sets forth guidelines for the limits of territorial waters that 
Greece wishes to acknowledge in the Aegean Sea and Turkey does not.  The continental shelf delineation is 
a similar example.  A final example is the militarization of the islands in the eastern Aegean: the Treaties of 
Lausanne set forth guidelines for the status of militarization of these islands that ensured a balance that both 
countries could accept.  The Treaty of Montreux, though, permitted the partial remilitarization of some of 
the Turkish islands, and with this example as precedence Greece has taken the recent development of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter as defense for remilitarizing some of her islands in the area.  In sum, the rules 
11 
the Aegean, that Greece still believes in the Megali Idea, and that Greece disregards 
Turkeys fundamental rights and interests in the Aegean.  
 Finally, in actuality, Greece believes that only one real dispute is lingering in the 
Aegean, that of the delimitation of the continental shelf.  The other disputes, she believes, 
including territorial waters, airspace, demilitarization of certain Eastern Aegean islands, 
and contested islets, are readily answered by existing international law and are therefore 
not really even under dispute.  Greece believes that these are only unilateral Turkish 
claims put forth against Greek sovereignty.12  Contrary to Greece, Turkey claims that the 
conflict over the delimitation of the continental shelf is not the only element among the 
outstanding differences  all the problems (territorial shelf, etc.) must be resolved in 
order to bring peace to the two countries. 
A. CONTINENTAL SHELF 
The actual conflicts in the Aegean did not heat up until 1 November 1973, when 
exploitable quantities of oil were discovered off the island of Thasos, Samothrace, and 
Chios.  It is perhaps not coincidental that this coincided with the energy crisis of late 
1973.  Greece had been conducting mineral exploration beyond her territorial waters 
since the early 1960s; Turkey wanted to stake her claim to what she believed should be 
at least shared and awarded exploration rights in the eastern Aegean to the Turkish State 
Petroleum Company.  In most places these areas were in international waters but were 
above areas of the continental shelf already claimed by Greece.  Turkey planned on 
developing oilrigs that would be surrounded by a 500-meter safety zone maintained by 
                                                 
and regulations set forth in the older treaties and agreements do not always jive with those set forth in the 
newer treaties and agreements, and this is one of the root causes of the Aegean dispute. 
12 Unilateral Turkish Claims in the Aegean.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece.  [HTTP] Available: 
http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/bilateral/aegeen.htm [18 September 2000]. 
12 
Turkish naval vessels.13  In addition, on the same day a chart was published showing the 
limiting line of the Turkish continental shelf as being west of several Greek islands.  
Greece consequently protested.  Despite proposing negotiations, Turkey sent the survey 
ship Candarli a few months later (escorted by 32 Turkish warships) to do studies in the 
area.  Similar Turkish explorations occurred in 1976 by the survey ship Sismik 1.  These 
situations were eventually diffused, but the continental shelf conflict was off and running 
and continues to this day. 
Since the incident in 1973 Greece and Turkey have yet to agree on an equitable 
way to delimit the continental shelf in the Aegean.  It is indeed the one issue where no 
clear solution is alleged to in any existing law or treaty.  In the same respect as the 
territorial sea issue, the dispute over the continental shelf ironically arose as attempts 
were made to produce a system of avoiding disputes (UNCLOS I  III)14  the more it 
was discussed in UNCLOS I  III to try to create an international system, the more that 
Greece and Turkey disagreed.  The dispute concerns the areas of continental shelf outside 
Greeces current six-mile territorial sea limit in the Aegean.  When the Treaty of 
Lausanne was signed in 1923 it was not an issue because at that time no one was thinking 
about getting natural resources such as oil and natural gas from the seabed.  In addition, 
the extent of territorial waters was (and had been for many years) only three miles and 
many of the islands were not even owned by Greece or Turkey (the Dodecanese islands, 
for example, were still owned by Italy).  With the discovery of oil in the Aegean, the 
change of ownership of some of the Aegean islands, and the extension of territorial 
                                                 
13 Constas, Dimitri, ed., The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, p. 14, New York: St. Martins Press, 
1991. 
14 Wilson, p. 4.  UNCLOS I was held in 1958. 
13 
waters (and thus ownership of the continental shelf under these waters), though, it has 
become a hotly debated topic. 
UNCLOS III does not help to resolve this problem on clear-cut lines.  Legally, 
Article 76(1) of UNCLOS III defines the continental shelf as comprising the sea-bed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial seas throughout the 
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to 
a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend 
up to that distance.15  The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of 
the land mass of the coastal State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the 
slope and the rise.16  The continental shelf, though, shall not exceed 350 nm.17  [See 
Figure 2.]  
In addition, the coastal State exercises over the continental shelf [exclusive] 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.18  
But, it is important to remember that the rights of the coastal State over the continental 
shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters [high seas] or of the air space 
above those waters and that the exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the 
continental shelf must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with 
navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States....19 
 
                                                 
15 United Nations, The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea with Annexes and Index, p. 27, United Nations, New York, 1983. 
16 Ibid., p. 27. 
17 Ibid., p. 27. 
18 Ibid., p. 28. 
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Figure 2. Legal Regimes of Oceans and Airspace Area.  From Submarine Officers 
Advanced Course (SOAC) Presentation Law of the Sea and Airspace.   
 
Greeces claims to the continental shelf in the Aegean are based on the legal 
regimes provided in the Treaty of Lausanne, the Treaty of Paris, and UNCLOS I and III.  
She claims that because she owns the majority of the islands in the Aegean (thus forming 
a Greek political continuum to the easternmost island in the Aegean), she also has 
sovereignty over the continental shelf based on the above definitions from the text of 
UNCLOS III.  This claim is based on Article 121 of UNCLOS III, which states: ...the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 28. 
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of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention 
applicable to other land territory.20 
Thus, Greece holds that because it owns the majority of the islands in the Aegean 
(including ones that are approximately 3 miles from Turkeys coastline), and because 
each of these islands has its own continental shelf that does not exceed the allowable 
depth in the above definition of continental shelf, she therefore owns an almost unbroken 
continental shelf from the Greek mainland to the Turkish Anatolian coast.21  Greece 
believes that the Turkish continental shelf, therefore, begins to the east of the easternmost 
Greek islands and not, as the Turkish claims would purport, to the west of them.  Any 
delimitation in the area between the islands and the Greek mainland would threaten 
Greek sovereignty over the islands and allow Turkey to further threaten Greek security in 
the future.  Greece believes that her claim is supported by the natural geology of the 
seabed of the Aegean, which is a natural extension of the islands and mainland of Greece 
and not, as Turkey claims, of the Anatolian coast.  This claim does not, of course, in 
accordance with UNCLOS III, threaten Turkeys use of the high seas or airspace above 
the continental shelf that is outside Greeces territorial waters.  Greeces claims, while 
always with final political advantage in mind, are thus based mostly on legal arguments. 
Turkish claims, on the contrary, are based more on political arguments and 
concerns about security and economy than on pure legalities.  Turkey claims that the 
Lausanne and Paris Treaties status quo of equity between the states should still be the 
guiding principle in how to partition the Aegean continental shelf.  In short, Turkey 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 39. 
21 The Journalists Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers, Threat in the Aegean, p. 21, Athens, The 
Journalists Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers, 1983 (?). 
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fears that sovereign rights in the continental shelf (in this case those of 
Greece) will develop into claims to full sovereignty over sea and air space, 
and that Greek claims to the continental shelf on the lines of the Geneva 
Convention will lead to the Aegean becoming quite literally a Greek sea, 
in which no amount of guarantees of Turkish navigation rights will 
safeguard her access to the high seas.  Fundamental to Turkeys position is 
her concept of herself as a modern state which has voluntarily joined the 
West and which aspires in due course to full membership of the European 
community.  To have access to the latters ports only through Greek 
waters would be precarious and humiliating.22 
 
Turkey claims that the application of Greeces arguments would result in Greece 
owning nearly all of the Aegean continental shelf.  She claims that the Aegean 
continental shelf is a natural prolongation of the Anatolian land and that she therefore has 
natural rights of exploration and economic exploitation in that shelf.  In addition, she 
does not believe that the islands of the Aegean are an extension of the Greek mainland 
because there are intervening high seas23 and cites several decisions of the International 
Court of Justice (and other tribunals and bilateral settlements) regarding special 
continental shelf/island cases as supporting her view.24  In effect, she wants to own areas 
of the Aegean continental shelf west of the Greek islands that are near the Turkish 
coastline.  For example, a line drawn halfway between the Greek and Turkish mainlands 
would be one favorable option.  Furthermore, Turkey refuses to accept that an island has 
its own continental shelf, as provided for in the UNCLOS III Treaty.  Turkey has, 
therefore, not yet acceded to the Treaty (though she respects certain parts of it 
unofficially) and does not believe that she must abide by the Treatys rules and 
regulations simply because, as Greece claims, they are a codification of existing 
                                                 
22 Wilson, p. 14. 
23 Ibid., p. 22. 
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customary international law.  Finally, Turkey stands by Article 15 of UNCLOS III, which 
calls for states to take into consideration historic title or other special circumstances (such 
as geography) that may affect a fair solution, and Article 300 of UNCLOS III, which says 
that [s]tates Parties...shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in 
this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.25  Turkey 
claims that the Aegean is such a special case and that ULCLOS III laws may not be 
applicable to the Aegean since it is a semi-enclosed sea.26 
B. TERRITORIAL SEAS 
The conflict over territorial waters ironically was similarly spurred on by the very 
regime that was supposed to bring worldwide maritime stability: UNCLOS III.  The 
conflict over territorial waters in the Aegean began in 1958 during the First United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I).  Prior to 1936 both countries 
maintained a three-mile territorial sea limit, and since then a six-mile territorial sea limit 
has been the norm in the Aegean Sea.  UNCLOS I in 1958 started discussions regarding 
extending the territorial sea limit to 12 miles; UNCLOS III formalized this twelve-mile 
limit when it came into force in November 1994.  Most countries worldwide endorsed it, 
including Greece and Turkey27, but when Greece threatened to extend the territorial 
waters surrounding the Aegean islands (most of which she owns), Turkey objected.  
                                                 
24 Several such examples exist, such as settled disputes over the Channel Islands in the English Channel and 
disputed islands between Australia and Papua, New Guinea.  See Bahcheli, Tozun, Greek-Turkish 
Relations Since 1955, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, p. 139-141. 
25 United Nations, p. 104. 
26 Article 15 technically refers to territorial waters.  Both of these Articles, though mentioned in support of 
Turkish territorial waters claims in many of the references, could be applied, in the opinion of the author, to 
the continental shelf issue also, and are strongly inferred in many of the primary and secondary readings on 
the Turkish views of the subject. 
27 Turkey supported the 12 nm limit and extended her non-Aegean territorial waters.  She did not, though, 
support Greeces right to extend her Aegean territorial waters; for this reason and some others, she did not 
(and has not to this day) signed or ratified UNCLOS III. 
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Expanding Greeces Aegean territorial seas to 12 miles would effectively make the 
Aegean more of a Greek sea than it already is and would totally enclose Turkeys Aegean 
coastline.  Turkey found and finds this situation unacceptable.   
Currently, Greece (as well as Turkey) still fixes the breadth of territorial water 
around her Aegean islands at 6 nautical miles (though they both fix their sea limit in non-
Aegean territorial waters at 12 miles).  This arrangement allows almost half of the 
Aegean to remain as high seas (and consequently international airspace28), which either 
country (as well as third countries) can use.  Greece maintains the right, though, under 
UNCLOS III to extend this breadth to 12 nm.  Twelve nautical miles is the internationally 
accepted standard, and she refuses to surrender this right.29  She has, though, indicated to 
Turkey and the rest of the international maritime community that, in the interest of good 
international relations, she has no intention of unilaterally extending her territorial waters.  
As mentioned before, Greece does not see this issue as one in dispute.  In her opinion, 
the issue is one that has already been settled by international law (specifically UNCLOS 
III); Turkish attempts at making this one of the disputed issues is, in Greek opinion, 
simply her attempt to evade international law and gain more control of the Aegean. 
Turkey, on the other hand, claims that Greece should not have the right to extend 
her territorial waters in the Aegean Sea (a semi-enclosed sea) to 12 nm and that if Greece 
were to do so it would lead to a state of casus belli (a cause of war).  Turkish reasoning is 
as follows: extending the Greek territorial water limit to 12 nm will increase Greek 
waters from approximately 35 percent of the Aegean to approximately 64 percent, giving 
Greece direct control over almost three-fourths of the Sea.  (A subsequent extension by 
                                                 
28 Airspace in the 6-10 nm zone around the Greek islands is, though, disputed.  See Section C below. 
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Turkey would only increase her territorial waters from approximately 9 percent to 10 
percent.) The high seas in the Aegean would be reduced from approximately 56 percent 
to 26 percent.30  [See Figures 3 and 4.]  
 
 
Figure 3. Present Distribution of Territorial Seas in the Aegean (6 nm).  From 
Schofield and Hocknell in Janes Intelligence Review, 
http://fore.thomson.com/janesdata/mags/jir/jir98/images/g2363.jpg.   
 
                                                 
29 Wilson, p. 23. 
30 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Figure 4. Possible Distribution of Territorial Seas in the Aegean (12 nm).  From 
Schofield and Hocknell in Janes Intelligence Review, 
http://fore.thomson.com/janesdata/mags/jir/jir98/images/g2364.jpg.   
 
Such an extension would turn the Aegean into a de facto Greek sea, fragmenting the areas 
of high seas due to the scattering of the Greek islands.  This would in essence confine 
Turkish vessels in their own territorial waters as well as block them from entering 
Turkish territorial waters from the Mediterranean Sea; in reality they would not actually 
be confined nor blocked because of the right of innocent passage, but Turkey feels that 
Greece would be able to control them and impose guidelines and restrictions to such 
21 
degrees as to take away the freedom of movement that they previously would have had.  
International traffic from third countries might also lose the freedom of unrestricted travel 
through formerly international Aegean waters; innocent passage does not apply to aircraft 
either.  Since the Turkish Anatolian coast would be effectively isolated, it could direly 
affect the Turkish economy, security, and scientific interests and, therefore, the Turkish 
people.  She would also lose the independence to conduct military operations on the sea 
and in the air of the Aegean, which could affect the defense of her state.  Finally, an 
extension of Greek territorial waters from 6 to 12 nm would give Greece an advantage in 
the resolution of the continental shelf issue by automatically increasing the amount of 
shelf over which she has corresponding sole jurisdiction.   
Turkey feels that Article 15 and Article 300 of UNCLOS III, as discussed in 
Section A, strongly support Turkeys claims: that extending the territorial waters from 6 
to 12 nm would be an abuse of right in an area of special circumstances.  Thus, in sum, 
she strongly opposes any extension of Greek territorial waters from 6 to 12 nm because it 
would adversely affect her vital interests. 
C. AIRSPACE 
The dispute over airspace control is similar to that of continental shelf 
delimitation in that both relate to each countrys desires to gain or maintain jurisdiction 
over the Aegean area and the others opposition to these attempts.  The Convention on 
International Civil Aviation on December 7, 1944 in Chicago established the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  The ICAOs main purpose is to 
regulate international civil aviation matters in the best and safest manner.31  In 1952 and 
                                                 
31 The Journalists Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers, p. 24. 
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1958, regional conferences of ICAO, with both Greece and Turkey participating, met to 
divide airspace where air traffic control is exercised.  The responsibility for such control 
was assigned to its member-countries and was divided into Flight Information Regions 
(FIRs).  These conferences decided that except for the narrow band of Turkish national 
airspace off the Anatolian coast, controlled airspace over the Aegean would be part of the 
Athens FIR.   
This arrangement, which was purely technical, meant that all aircraft 
flying west from Turkey, whether civil or military, were required to file 
flight plans and report position as they crossed the FIR boundary a minute 
or so after leaving the Turkish coast.  They then came under orders of 
the Athens flight control centre, which was responsible for providing 
meteorological and other information.32 
 
Similarly, aircraft flying eastwards were required to report to the Istanbul control center 
as they crossed into the Turkish FIR a minute or so prior to crossing the Turkish coast.  If 
the FIR boundary had been placed any further west, Greek aircraft flying to the eastern 
Greek islands would have been required to pass through a Turkish control zone.  It was 
thus consistent with geography and worked well until the Turkish military action in 
Cyprus in 1974 raised suspicions of further military action from both sides; worried 
officials in both countries, but especially Turkey, believed that the airspace control 
regime put them at a disadvantage in the case of an attack from the air, and consequently 
came under dispute. 
On August 4, 1974 Turkey unilaterally issued NOTAM33 714.  NOTAM 714 
required all aircraft approaching Turkish airspace to report their position and flight plan 
on reaching the Aegean median line, which lay considerably to the west of the FIR line.  
                                                 
32 Wilson, p. 6. 
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The purpose, according to later Turkish explanation, was to enable Turkish military radar 
to distinguish between innocent flights and potential attackers bound for targets in Asia 
Minor.34  Greece believed that this went against ICAO regulations and retaliated by 
issuing, on September 13, NOTAM 1157, which declared the Aegean airspace unsafe due 
to conflicting control orders.35  All major airlines subsequently suspended service in the 
area, direly affecting flights to the Middle East and Far East as well as both countries 
tourism and economy.   
These NOTAMs were withdrawn in 1980 and normal civil aviation was resumed 
in the area, yet the FIR dispute continues and is simply part of a broader struggle to gain 
jurisdiction over the airspace of the Aegean: since 1931 Greece has claimed 10 miles of 
sovereign airspace around her Aegean islands.  Turkey now openly objects to this claim 
(prior to 1975 Turkey silently objected, as discussed below) and says that in accordance 
with international law36 the national airspace should correspond to the breadth of 
territorial sea.  Turkey accordingly feels that Greeces national airspace should be 6 
miles.37 
Furthermore, Greece requests that Turkey submit flight plans for her military 
aircraft that are operating in the Athens FIR; Turkey claims that she is not required to 
submit such flight plans.  To establish her legal objection to the Athens FIR and to 
Greeces attempt to control the Aegean airspace by attempting to make Turkey file flight 
                                                 
33 Notice to Airmen and Mariners  a notice to ICAO for transmission to all air users. 
34 Wilson, p. 6. 
35 Constas, p. 15. 
36 The Department of State, Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, Chicago, Illinois, 
November 1  December 7, 1944, Vol. I, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
1948.  See Article VIII, Sections 1 and 2, pp. 138-139.  UNCLOS III confirmed this rule; see United 
Nations, p. 3. 
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plans for her military aircraft, Turkey refuses to submit flight plans for her military 
aircraft to the Athens FIR.38  In reality ICAO does not cover military aircraft but rather 
only civil aircraft39; therefore, Turkish refusal to submit flight plans for her military 
aircraft is not a violation of ICAO rules but only Greek requests.40  Turkey also 
periodically sends military aircraft to fly into the disputed airspace (and sometimes even 
Greek national airspace inside 6 nm over various islands) to establish her objection to 
Greeces requests and to the Athens FIR.  Greece accordingly protests and reacts by 
scrambling its own fighter aircraft to intercept these officially labeled unknown 
aircraft.  These confrontations have occurred quite frequently over the years with 
occasional tragic result and hold the potential to cause more tragic international incidents 
in the future.  In one of the more famous recent such incidents, in October 1997 the 
Greek defense minister was on a Greek C-130 flight to Cyprus when he was buzzed by 
Turkish F-16s.  He was also buzzed on the return trip, provoking angry Greek accusations 
of provocation.  Though the lack of a serious military escalation seems to indicate both 
sides reluctance to escalate the dispute into a military clash (which can be said for the 
broader Aegean dispute as well), these confrontations may inadvertently be the spark that 
could ignite the disagreement into an undesired war and must therefore be stopped 
through resolution of the conflict. 
                                                 
37 In fact, the United States and other states party to ICAO and UNCLOS III also disagree with Greeces 
position.  See Bahcheli, p. 145. 
38 Schofield, Clive, and Peter Hocknell, Instability in the Eastern Mediterranean, A Cypriot crisis in the 
making, Janes Intelligence Review, p. 8, March 1998. 
39 The Department of State, Article VIII, Section 3, p. 139. 
40 NATO and the United States concur with Turkey that all parties should indeed follow the ICAO 
international norms and do not file flight plans for their military aircraft either.  From conversation with 
Tjarck Roessler, thesis advisor, 30 January 2001. 
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Greece stakes its claims on several justifications.  First, it has claimed the 10 mile 
national airspace for many years, does not wish to give up a right it proclaimed so many 
years ago, and Turkey only recently objected to the disparity (1975).  She claims she 
needs 10 miles vice 6 because of aircraft speeds.  In fact, Greek officials have 
occasionally suggested that they could remedy the problem by extending both the 
territorial seas and airspace to 12 miles  Turkey is not amused by these ruses.41  Second, 
Greece views Turkish attempts to gain more control of the FIR simply as attempts to gain 
more control of the Aegean.  Third, she says that the FIR boundaries virtually coincide 
with the geographic boundaries between the two countries, and that if they were moved 
any further west then Greek aircraft flying eastward to Greek islands would at times be 
obliged to report to Turkish authorities while in Greek sovereign airspace.  This would be 
contrary to international law and ICAO would never approve such a change.  Fourth, 
Greece says that since Turkey was present at and accepted the ICAO conferences that 
delineated the FIR boundaries Turkey should not be objecting now.  And in addition, 
control of international airspace in a FIR does not mean sovereignty over that airspace 
anyway.  Greece thus regards Turkish actions such as national airspace violations and the 
issuance of NOTAM 714 as complete disregard for international law and claims that 
control of the Aegean FIR is a purely technical job.  She therefore sees the Turkish 
claims, since the proposed FIR boundary roughly corresponds to the proposed continental 
shelf boundary, as a purely political attempt to link the two issues and gain more control 
of the Aegean for her benefit. 
                                                 
41 Bahcheli, p. 144. 
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Turkey, on the other hand, sees the Greek claim of 10 miles of airspace 
sovereignty as evidence of Greek attempts to control the Aegean airspace and claims that 
it should correspond to the territorial sea limit of 6 miles.  She says that she has indeed 
never officially approved or even silently accepted Greeces 10-mile airspace claim; she 
has silently objected since 1931 and officially challenged it only recently (1975) because 
prior to 1975 Greece had not given proper official notification of the 10-mile limit.42  
Furthermore, Turkey has repeatedly accused Greek officials of abusing the purely 
technical FIR responsibilities to gain de facto control of the Aegean.  She alleges that 
Greece has created new air corridors without consulting Ankara (as is required by ICAO 
rules), has created control zones around certain islands, and has deliberately interfered 
with Turkish military exercises by refusing to issue the appropriate Turkish NOTAMs or 
by unilaterally amending them.43  Though there is considerable evidence of these Greek 
actions, Greece claims that she has never used her FIR responsibilities for any purpose 
other than safety and facilitation of air traffic.  Also, Turkey feels that Greece constantly 
regards the international airspace over which she has FIR control as her own national 
airspace and that Greece regards the Athens FIR as a defense perimeter.  The defense 
perimeter would account for vehement Greek insistence that all military air operations are 
reported to the Athens FIR.  Turkey insists that under international law military aircraft 
flying in international airspace are under no obligation to submit flight plans,44 and that 
any such requirement would hinder Turkish military exercises and the defense of her 
state.  Finally, she feels that the FIR boundary is too close to her land border and for 
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 144. 
43 Ibid., p. 146. 
44 Turkish-Greek Relations, Aegean Problems.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.  [HTTP] Available: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adea/default.htm  [12 September 2000]. 
27 
security purposes desires a system giving balanced control as well as sufficient mutual 
early warning of military operations.45 
D. DEMILITARIZATION/MILITARIZATION OF EASTERN AEGEAN 
ISLANDS 
Greece and Turkey also disagree over the demilitarization/militarization of certain 
eastern Aegean islands, though this dispute seems to take a backseat to the other issues 
discussed above.  Prior to 1923, Turkey was concerned about the possible use of the 
islands of the eastern Aegean as a Greek starting spot for attacks on Turkey, and therefore 
had asked for their demilitarization.  The Treaty of Lausanne and Treaty of Montreux, as 
well as the Treaty of Paris and several other smaller treaties, established not only the 
sovereignty but also the demilitarized status of these islands.  The Treaty of Lausanne 
demilitarized most of the Greek and Turkish islands and coastal areas with the exception 
of police forces, gendarmerie, etc.  The Treaty of Montreux, though, partially revised the 
Treaty of Lausanne by allowing the partial remilitarization of certain islands near the 
Dardanelles.  The definition of just what are appropriate police forces and gendarmerie 
and just what remilitarization was permitted by the Treaty of Montreux are at the core of 
the demilitarization dispute.  Because the countries were in a period of détente in the 
middle of the twentieth century, no questions were raised regarding this status quo; it was 
conducive to peace.  But beginning in the 1960s with the rising tensions over Cyprus and 
especially in 1974 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus this question re-emerged as one 
of great importance to both countries.   
 
 
                                                 
45 Wilson, p. 24. 
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Legally, the issue can be divided into three different groups: 
a) Lemnos and Samothrace  the Treaty of Lausanne demilitarized these Greek 
islands due to their proximity to the Turkish straits (Dardanelles).  Turkey claims 
that the Treaty of Montreux of 1936 confirmed this status and that it holds to this 
day.  Greece claims that the Treaty of Montreux canceled the demilitarized status 
of these islands.  The statement of the Turkish Foreign Minister at the time 
complicates Turkeys position: The provisions concerning the islands of Lemnos 
and Samothrace which belong to our friend and neighbour, Greece, and which had 
been demilitarized by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, are abolished also by the 
Treaty of Montreux and we are particularly pleased about this.46 Turkey 
responds that it was simply a statement of goodwill and that it does not change the 
provisions that the Treaty of Montreux sets forth. 
b) Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria  the Treaty of Lausanne also demilitarized 
these Greek islands but with provisions that they could station military forces 
there that were locally recruited as well as a force of police and gendarmerie 
proportionate to the force of police and gendarmerie throughout the rest of 
Greece.  No bases or fortifications were to be established, though.  Turkey objects 
to the high number of military and police forces that Greece has placed on these 
islands. 
c) The Dodecanese Islands  the Treaty of Paris ordered these Greek islands 
demilitarized but left a provision for the maintenance of internal security forces.  
                                                 
46 Bahcheli, p. 148. 
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Again, Turkey objects to the high number of internal security forces that Greece 
has placed on these islands.47 
Following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and several threatening and 
aggressive statements by Turkish officials, Greece felt for self-defense reasons that it 
needed to remilitarize these islands.  She claims that all militarization that has taken place 
is in accordance with the treaties named above and that United Nations (UN) Charter 
Article 51 allows for the inherent right to self-defense.  She feels that her militarization 
was further justified by Turkeys subsequent establishment in 1975 of the Army of the 
Aegean (Turkeys 4th Army) on the Anatolian coast, which she sees as offensive and a 
real threat to Greek sovereignty and security.  This Army is equipped with the largest 
non-oceangoing landing force in the world and is not part of NATO48, proving to Greek 
eyes the offensive nature of Turkeys 4th Army.  Greece in fact reinforced her island 
forces only after the establishment of Turkeys 4th Army, furthering her claim that these 
island forces are defensive.  Greece says that Turkish objections are out of a fear of 
Greek aggressiveness and confirms that all militarization is proportional, for local 
defense only, and helps maintain security and the balance of power in the region.  Finally, 
Greece claims that Turkey was not a signatory of the Treaty of Paris affecting the 
Dodecanese islands and therefore has no legal grounds to challenge Greeces actions in 
the Dodecaneses.   
Turkey objects to the Greek remilitarization of these eastern Aegean islands. She 
objects to the great numbers of armed forces on Lemnos and Samothrace, to a greater 
number of gendarmerie than is necessary on Lesbos, Chios, Samos and Ikaria, to an 
                                                 
47 Wilson, p. 16. 
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abuse of the right to place limited forces on the Dodecaneses, to the military character 
that several airports had taken, and to the naval installations/naval vessels throughout the 
islands.  For Turkey the issue is not just Greek disregard for the treaties: due to their close 
proximity to the Turkish coastline, she sees these forces as a threat for quick invasion or 
for air strikes against the Turkish mainland.  She therefore views the 4th Army as 
defensive49 and also stands by Article 51 of the UN Charter.  Turkey holds that there is a 
direct link in the aforementioned treaties between Greek ownership of the islands and 
their demilitarized status (an argument that Greece does not agree with), that this should 
still hold true, and that Greece is not upholding its international obligations.  In sum, 
Turkey feels that Greeces illegal militarization of the islands of the eastern Aegean 
upsets the status quo established by the Lausanne Treaty and therefore presses for the 
removal/reduction of Greek forces in these areas. 
E. DISPUTED ISLANDS, ISLETS, AND ROCKS 
The final major issue on which Greece and Turkey disagree (though like 
demilitarization it seems to take a backseat to the first three more major issues) is the 
status of several disputed islands, islets, and rocks.  While it seems that such minor pieces 
of land would not be of major concern, the issue has explosive potential as witnessed in 
the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis.  The tiny (only several acres big) Imia/Kardak rocks (Imia 
in the Greek language and Kardak in Turkish) are located approximately 3.8 miles off the 
Anatolian coast of Turkey (near the city of Bodrum) and 5.5 miles from the Greek island 
of Kalimnos.  [See Figures 5 and 6.]  They support practically no life or economic 
possibility, are inhabited only by several happy seagulls and grazing goats, and were 
                                                 
48 Schofield and Hocknell, p. 8. 
49 Bahcheli, p. 148. 
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considered no more than navigation hazards until the incident.  The strait in which they 
are located is very narrow, indicating that their possession would have minimal impact on 
anything of importance (like fishing, boundary delimitation, or oil).50  Nevertheless, there 
are also many other islets/rocks throughout the Aegean the sovereignty of which are 
under dispute.  Like Imia/Kardak, to a non-Greek or -Turk these gray areas seemingly  
 
 
Figure 5. Imia/Kardak region.  From Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 
http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/bilateral/moremaps/imia2hol.jpg.   
 
                                                 
50 Schofield and Hocknell, p. 9. 
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Figure 6. Imia/Kardak.  From Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, 
http://www.mfa.gr/foreign/bilateral/imiamap.htm.   
 
hold little significance, but to the Greeks and Turks they are much more important and tie 
in to the larger overall Aegean dispute. 
By the pure coincidence of a freighter running aground this issue assumed a large 
place in the broader Aegean conflict between the countries.  On December 25, 1995 the 
Turkish freighter Figen Akat ran aground on these small rocks.  In the following weeks 
there was no crisis, but when Greek authorities offered to commence salvage operations 
on January 20, 1996 the Turkish captain refused help from the Greek tug because he 
claimed he was on Turkish territory.51  When Greek newspapers such as GAMMA got 
word of the story, they raised nationalistic questions of sovereignty over the rocks.  
Athens rejected Turkish claims of sovereignty, and Ankara rejected Greek claims.  The 
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mayor of Kalimnos raised the Greek flag on the rocks.  Turkish journalists responded by 
replacing the Greek flag with the Turkish flag the following day.  [See Figure 7.]  When 
Greek commandos then landed on the rocks and unfurled the Greek flag again, Turkey 
had plans to overrun the Greeks there.52  Both countries followed over the ensuing weeks 
by building up their military on, over, and in the waters in the vicinity of the rocks.  
Among the forces Turkey sent were three frigates, three attack craft, and a destroyer; 
among the forces Greece sent were two frigates, a destroyer, three fast attack craft, and 
Mirage fighters.  (Even forces on both sides of the Cyprus dividing line were put on 
alert.)53  Opposing armed forces were stationed only a few hundred yards apart.  The 
 
 
Figure 7. Greek and Turkish press fueling flag race on Imia/Kardak in 1996.  From 
Schofield and Hocknell in Janes Intelligence Review, 
http://fore.thomson.com/janesdata/mags/jir/jir98/images/p2362.jpg.   
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press published stories with nationalistic overtones, further escalating the issue.54  Even 
the European Parliament, much to the dismay of Turkey, passed a vote on 15 February 
1996 on the provocative actions and contestation of sovereign rights by Turkey against a 
Member State of the [European] Union.55  This vote even further enflamed the issue. 
The dangerous military situation was eventually diffused via intense pressure 
from high U.S diplomats (including President Bill Clinton) to both sides  a compromise 
was reached where both sides withdrew their forces and flags and returned to the status 
quo, but much to the dissatisfaction of nationalists in both countries, especially 
Greece.56  Even though this military conflict has been resolved, though, both countries 
still claim ownership of Imia/Kardak.  
It is interesting to note the reactions of each country to the compromise and 
subsequent withdrawal of the military in the 1996 Imia/Kardak conflict.  Greeces 
government viewed the withdrawal as a victory.  Prime Minister Constantine Simitis said, 
Turkey failed in its effort to force Greece to negotiate the legal status of the islets.  
The islet of Imia is and will remain Greek.57 But he received harsh criticism, despite 
his strong stance, from domestic media, political opponents, and the general public 
because Greek sovereignty was not defended. 
You have agreed to lower the Greek flag on Imia, to pull back Greek 
armed forces from Greek territory and you have tolerated the landing of 
Turkish forces on a Greek island.  Turkey stayed as long as it wished on 
this island and left when they themselves judged it necessary, 
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[Conservative opposition leader Miltiades] Evert said, to thunderous 
applause from his partys MPs.  The Greek government failed to 
understand the trap laid by Ankara, which wanted to challenge the legal 
status of the Aegean Sea, he said.  Simitis hit back, saying: We have 
succeeded in avoiding a conflict between Greek and Turkish forces  and 
reduced tension with no negotiation with Turkey over the legal status of 
the Greek islets.  We were ready to go to war and we would have done so 
if it had been necessary.  We did not want to fall into the Turkish trap of 
forcing negotiation over the status of our Aegean islands.  After five, six 
or seven days of war, we would have been forced to sit down at the 
negotiating table, which was what the Turks wanted.  Greek sovereignty is 
not negotiable.  Nothing has changed about the status of Imia.58 
 
Evert responded by saying, The removal of Greek troops and the lowering of the Greek 
flag constitute an act of treason.59  And an editorial in the Simerini, a Greek Cypriot 
paper, said, It is useful for the American pimps, supporters, and financiers of the  
repulsive Turkish state to know our feelings after the postponement of this war: We feel 
humiliated, we feel ashamed, and we feel defeated again.60 
 The Turkish government also viewed the compromise and subsequent withdrawal 
of the military as a victory.  She viewed it as a victory because their planned commando 
action was the event that forced Greece off the rocks, because Greece did not defend her 
supposed sovereignty, and because Turkish claims to the rocks were still very much 
justified.  The Government of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller characterized the outcome 
of the incident as a triumph.  We expressed our decisiveness very clearly, she said.  We 
said this flag will come down, these soldiers will go.  There is no other solution, and we 
got our result.61  But nevertheless, some nationalistic journalists, politicians, and 
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commoners were upset that their government had given in and looked at the compromise 
and withdrawal as a national defeat. 
This conflict has since been taken to other areas, for example the island of 
Gavdos.  Turkey opposed its inclusion in the 1996 NATO exercise DYNAMIC MIX 
due to its disputed status of property.62  Greece was flabbergasted at the allegation, but 
NATO and Greece were forced to deal with it.  The dispute over islands, islets, and rocks 
(as well as the other issues in the broader Greek/Turkish conflict) thus has the potential to 
disrupt day-to-day operations and will undoubtedly fester along with the rest of the 
issues. 
The detailed justifications of each side regarding how the many various treaties 
prove the sovereignty of these gray areas are beyond the scope of this thesis.  In short, 
though, Greece feels that the sovereignty of all of the gray islands is not in question; 
the treaties discussed earlier in this thesis are very clear as to which country owns what.  
They are specific, name individual islands, and formalize that Greece owns the majority 
of the islands in the Aegean.  She objects to the Turkish view that any small islet/rock not 
specifically named in a treaty is automatically Turkish.  In fact, Greece points out that 
Turkey has accepted the current status for over 70 years and is now making direct claims 
on Greek sovereign territory.  She says that this incident was especially threatening 
because it was the first time since World War II that one of the countries (Turkey in this 
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case) has asked to change the borders and because for the first time in the Aegean dispute 
Turkey has landed troops on soil claimed by the Greeks.63   
Turkey, on the other hand, claims that numerous islands, islets, and rocks were 
not specifically ceded to Greece by formal legal treaty and, because of their Turkish 
ownership prior to 1923, are therefore still Turkish and have been throughout the 
twentieth century.  She feels that Greeces sudden desire for possession of these gray 
areas further indicates Greeces aggressive expansionistic intentions.  Turkey feels that 
this issue is directly related to the disputes over territorial waters, continental shelf, and 
airspace in that the more land over which Greece has sovereignty, the more territorial 
waters, continental shelf, and airspace she could potentially claim.  She even feels that it 
is related to demilitarization of the islands of the eastern Aegean and delimitation of 
maritime boundaries between the countries.64  Additionally, Turkey made her claims on 
Imia/Kardak so strongly due to the proximity of the rocks to the Turkish mainland (3.8 
miles); the more Greece owns near Turkeys coastline, the more easily Greece could act 
militarily against her.  Likewise, the more Greece owns near Turkeys coastline, the more 
difficult it would be for Turkey to economically exploit the Aegean. 
While it would appear that this is a trivial matter over which to argue, several 
deeper (and more understandable) reasons emerge for the staunch stance taken by both 
Turkey and Greece.  First of all, at the time of the incident both governments were weak 
and in a state of transition/strife; they consequently were not able to keep the situation 
under control as well as they should have.  All of this is obviously a function of 
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absentee civilian leaders, said one senior official.  You have a classic situation in which 
the militar[ies are] disproportionately influential, and their inherent hostility toward each 
other just exploded.65   
Second, ownership of Imia/Kardak could have great impact on the other issues 
under dispute in the Aegean.  The owner could conceivably extend the territorial waters 
around Imia/Kardak to 6 or even 12 nm, restricting the strait in which it is located and 
bringing these international waters under national control.  This could then impact the 
claims of ownership of the continental shelf (and any minerals) under the territorial 
waters and the airspace over them.  Since the rocks are in such close proximity to the 
Turkish mainland, a potentially explosive situation could be created.   
Additionally, the more of the Aegean over which each country has sovereignty, 
the better her economy will be.  There would be more potential shipping that each could 
control and more potential oil, gas, and mineral reserves that each could reap.  More 
sovereignty over the Aegean means more fishing, and could also boost potential money 
from recreation and tourism.   
The final root cause of this dispute is the same root cause of each of the greater 
Aegean disputes: ownership of Imia/Kardak and its ties to the continental shelf and 
territorial waters could have great impact on each countrys sense of national prestige, 
honor, and inherent mistrust of the other side.  Ownership of the rocks themselves would 
probably not yield much economically, but symbolically they would mean more 
sovereignty over the Aegean.  And the more sovereignty over the Aegean, the more 
national prestige and honor for each country and the greater that each country can 
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respond to their seemingly innate nationalism and mistrust of the other side.  This 
nationalism and mistrust of the other side, as will be discussed in Chapter V, are indeed 
the root cause of the entire Aegean dispute.  They played a huge role in the Imia/Kardak 















































The dispute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea has not only 
affected these two countries but has also directly impacted NATO.  An issue of special 
concern since the 1960s but a political battleground since the Turkish Cyprus invasion 
of 1974, NATOs common defense planning and even common operations and exercises 
have been hampered, constrained, confused, and sometimes even halted altogether 
because of this ongoing dispute.  All of the quarrels described in Chapter II, but 
especially the disputes over airspace, territorial waters, ownership of islands, and 
demilitarization, have been a worrisome irritation to NATO.  Even though bilateral and 
NATO relations have tremendously improved since the successful accomplishment of the 
new NATO Command Structure  including the Aegean subregions organization - in 
1999, exercises and day-to-day operations are still causing new conflicts and irritations or 
being hampered, further impressing the need for a resolution to the Aegean dispute soon 
in the future. 
A. NATO STARTS TO FEEL THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 
Though the brunt of the impact of the Greek/Turkish dispute that is relevant for 
this thesis has been felt since 1974, the ongoing tensions between the countries have 
caused NATO problems since Greece and Turkeys joining the alliance.  Quarreling over 
Cyprus since its independence in 1960, for example, was one of the situations that was 
causing rifts in the alliance and that was triggering more calls for its dismantling.66   
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Though the opportunity to ally with Greece and Turkey and defend the 
southeastern flank was advantageous, the lengths to which the alliance has had to go to 
accommodate Greece and Turkey are great.  If the most obvious benefit NATO gained 
when Greece and Turkey joined the military organization in 1952 was the opportunity to 
coordinate a forward defense of its southern flank, its most obvious liability since 1974 
has been a lack of coordination that is evident in every forum in which the two allies are 
represented.67 
Lack of coordination between Greek and Turkish forces assigned to 
NATO creates vulnerabilities extending beyond the Aegean that the 
alliance has sought to disguise rather than eliminate.  When NATO was 
geared exclusively to the containment of the Soviet Union, its military 
planners did not envisage many tactical situations in wartime in which 
military forces of the two countries would participate in joint land or 
maritime operations.  The preeminent mission of Greek and Turkish forces 
was defense of the homeland.  In the event of hostilities with the Warsaw 
Pact, NATO hoped for holding actions in Greek and Turkish Thrace, in 
the Aegean, and in eastern Turkey that would test Soviet intentions and, in 
the event of a major Soviet attack, prevent these areas from being overrun 
before reinforcements arrived from Western Europe and the United States.  
The coincidence of their national and NATO military missions explains 
why Greece and Turkey were able to make significant adjustments in their 
force deployments and defense plans without being directly challenged by 
NATOs Defense Planning and Military Committees.  Although the most 
casual scrutiny of Greek and Turkish orders of battle clearly showed that 
their forces in the Aegean theater were deployed primarily against each 
other, not the Warsaw Pact, NATO chose to treat them as forces executing 
a national defense mission consistent with NATO plans and not to raise 
the more awkward question of what threat they were defending themselves 
against.68   
 
But lack of coordination is by no means the only problem that Greece and Turkey 
have caused over the years  some others are discussed in the next section.  Despite these 
many problems, though, Greece and Turkeys memberships in NATO were and are still 
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desired and remain critical to the alliance for many reasons.  First, they provide for the 
defense of the southeastern flank, as critical now as it was during the Cold War.  In 
addition (and more importantly recently), they provide access to the Middle East.  Access 
to Iraq and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War through Turkey proved invaluable, as did 
use of Greek airspace and naval facilities in the Aegean.  Also, U.S. bases in the two 
countries provide critical forward staging posts for U.S. personnel and equipment; the 
best example for this strategic value are the air operations against Iraq which have 
commenced from bases in southeastern Turkey.  Moreover, Turkey has the second largest 
armed force in NATO.69  And finally, Turkey serves as Israels only ally in the region 
and a check on Syria and Iran.70 
In sum, even under charged political strategic conditions since the end of the Cold 
War, Greece and Turkey are still important for NATO.  Since they joined the alliance, 
though, they have caused NATO much damage because of their ongoing disputes.  This 
damage was not only in the form of actual operating and logistical problems, though.  
Another, and perhaps greater, problem began to be felt in the NATO planning and 
decision-making bodies.  Confidence within the alliance was waning, and the rift between 
Greece and Turkey caused initiatives, decisions, and even day-to-day operating 
requirements that needed unanimous consensus to stall.  These stalls, combined with the 
operating problems, were a great impediment to NATO especially over the last quarter of 
the twentieth century and caused many of the major problems that are discussed below.  
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B. THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON NATO 1974-199971 
1. Greek Withdrawal from NATOs Integrated Military Structure from 
1974 to 1980 
The greatest impact of the Greek-Turkish dispute on NATO has been since the 
fighting in Cyprus in 1974.  After the coup in Cyprus, strongly supported but more 
importantly initiated by the military dictatorship in Greece, the Greek Colonels regime 
was overthrown and a new democratic government came in.  The new political leaders 
were so upset with the way the United States had supported the overthrown dictatorship, 
with the U.S. acceptance of Turkish military actions on Cyprus, and with the Turkish 
actions on Cyprus themselves, that it withdrew immediately from NATOs integrated 
military command structure and remained out until 1980.72  Greek Prime Minister 
Constantine Karamanlis said, 
I had to chose.  Either to declare war on Turkey or to leave 
NATO.  Between the two I chose the lesser evil.  That the Greek political 
leader most identified with a policy of Western alignment should have 
believed it necessary to choose between continued membership in NATO 
or war against a fellow member demonstrates how far Greek-Turkish 
antagonism had been permitted to abort the alliances military mission in 
the eastern Mediterranean.73 
 
Turkey, for her part, was also upset with the United States; when the United 
States, under great pressure from Congress74, placed an embargo on transfers of military 
equipment to Turkey, effective in February 1975, Turkey responded by suspending U.S. 
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operations at U.S. bases in Turkey.75  Greece, Turkey, and the United States were thus at 
odds with each other, and consequently the common alliance, NATO, suffered damage.  
This damage was in preparedness, in communications, in troop placement, in planning, 
and in cohesion.  Without Greece operating militarily in the alliance and without access 
to U.S. bases in Turkey, protecting and operating in NATOs southeastern flank was 
especially challenging.  Greece eventually reentered the military command structure of 
NATO in 1980 (though Turkey vetoed Greeces full reintegration for three years further), 
but it was still years before most of the problems caused by her withdrawal would be 
worked out.  Indeed, operations are in fact still not completely smooth today. 
2. Country Chapters 
The Greek-Turkish dispute has caused such a deadlock in NATOs Defense 
Planning Review that since 1970 each country has vetoed the others country chapter, 
the yearly inventory of forces assigned to NATO which serves as the core for NATOs 
common defense planning.  Turkey and Greece vetoed the others country chapter 
because of many disagreements: for example, over placement of troops on Greek islands 
which should, in the eyes of Turkey, have been demilitarized, and over the unreported 
numbers of Turkish troops in the TRNC when, in the eyes of Greece, the Turkish 4th 
Army on Turkish soil alone already poses a large threat to the Greek possessions in the 
Aegean Sea.  Both also disagreed with the others infrastructural spending.76  With no 
country chapter, common defense planning over the years was difficult at best. 
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3. Budgetary Problems 
Each country furthermore vetoed the funding to NATOs established (e.g., NATO 
HQ Izmir, Turkey) and to-be-reestablished (e.g., NATO HQ Larissa, Greece) regional 
installations and headquarters, thereby starving these establishments of much needed 
money.  In addition, yearly running budgets were exceeded.  Because each year the 
new running budget could not be approved, the new running budget automatically 
reverted to the previous years.  In practical terms, this amounted to regressing to the 
running budget that had been approved prior to the initial country chapter veto. 
Funding to many other secondary budgetary requirements was additionally halted.  
For example, respective vetoes blocked additional funding to supplemental programs that 
had an impact on NATO installations.  Communications equipment and cryptographic 
equipment, for example, did not get properly cared for and upgraded, resulting in 
degradation or even loss of communications between headquarters in Izmir, for instance, 
and other NATO headquarters.  Modernization and use of common equipment throughout 
NATO was difficult at best. 
As an example, squabbling between the two countries in 1987 and 1988 resulted 
in failure to approve about half of the proposed projects (which require unanimous 
approval before funds can be dispensed).  This squabbling cost Turkey $252 million and 
Greece $144 million, amounts that neither country can individually afford to jeopardize.  
It also cost NATO in readiness, efficiency, and fortification.77 
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4. NATO Exercises 
Many NATO exercises in the Aegean have been either altered or halted altogether 
due to the Greek-Turkish dispute.  In other exercises either Greece or Turkey (or both) 
has withdrawn from an exercise because of certain objections to the way it was being run, 
to the islands that were included or not included, to the roles that the other was playing in 
certain scenarios, etc.  Lack of full completion of an exercise as originally designed 
negatively affects the readiness, cohesiveness, and confidence of the forces and, 
therefore, of the alliance.  Also, exercises in which all the participants do not fully agree 
with or intend to comply with the plan hold the potential (as in the day-to-day dueling of 
aircraft in disputed airspace) for deadly accidents.  Finally, when an alliance cannot agree 
on the manner in which to conduct an exercise (much less an actual operation) it makes 
the alliance look incompetent and less credible to those outside the alliance; the 
spectacle of one NATO ally conducting mock dogfights with another in aircraft supplied 
by a third does little to strengthen the alliances credibility and much to emphasize 
NATOs responsibility to do more than it has to eliminate the risk of hostilities between 
two of its members.78  Similar embarrassments occur on the surface of the Aegean, with 
Turkish naval vessels shadowing their Greek counterparts and vice-versa. 
The exercises that have been affected by the dispute are too numerous to list and 
discuss in this thesis.  One typical example, though, is worth looking at as typical of all 
the others.  In the 1983 exercise APEX EXPRESS the Greek island of Limnos was 
excluded from the exercise area in order to appease Turkey because of her objection to 
Limnoss militarized status.  Limnos was, though, included in the free play part of the 
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exercise (when Greek and Turkish forces were not bound by the scenario) so that Greece 
was appeased by assuming that it was indeed part of the exercise.  The Greek press 
reported (incorrectly) that because it was included in the exercise NATO supported 
Greeces right to militarize Limnos.  Turkey publicly objected, and Greece subsequently 
withdrew.79   
Greece also boycotted the annual DISPLAY DETERMINATION exercise in the 
same year with the same objections, and again in 1988 because of objections to NATO 
infrastructural spending in the other.80  In other exercises communiqués and plans were 
skewed or altered in order to placate one or the other country.  These are examples of the 
kinds of little squabbles that have plagued NATO exercises over the past two decades. 
5. New Command Structure 
A last NATO prerogative that has been affected by the Greek-Turkish dispute was 
the implementation of the new NATO command structure.  In 1992 the NATO Command 
Structure document MC-294 was agreed upon by the NATO Military Committee but not 
eventually endorsed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).  In NATOs top ranking 
political decision-making body, the necessary unanimous approval could not be reached: 
both Greece and Turkeys politicians disapproved of the regional command structure 
with regard to the above mentioned central issues of the status of militarization, numbers 
and deployment of forces, etc.  Thus MC-294 was relegated to working document and 
in effect only some of the improvements were implemented.   
In total, including the open issue of the final endorsement of the command 
structure, thirteen critical projects and working programs of MC-294 were under 
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blockade.  Though a completely new Command Structure was finally approved in 1999, 
the Greek-Turkish dispute caused NATO over seven years of not receiving the benefits 
and improvements that MC-294 would have brought earlier.   
 
To summarize, since 1974 the Greek-Turkish dispute has thus been extremely 
detrimental not only to the operational capabilities of the alliance but also to its cohesion.  
The alliance was further damaged when Greeces Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou 
widened the opening rift in NATO by asking the other NATO members, in 1981,  
to state formally that NATO guarantees under Article 5 applied to threats 
from within the alliance as well as from outside it.  Denials by the Turks 
that they were threatening Greece and complaints from other members 
that, under the circumstances, passage of a resolution like the one 
proposed by Papandreou would constitute a reproach Turkey did not 
merit, resulted in the defeat of the Greek initiative.  Most of the other 
members believed that such a pledge would add nothing to the treaty 
which, in any event, under Article 1, affirmed the commitment of the 
parties to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved 
by peaceful means. Papandreou, however, refused to approve the text 
of a final communiqué that did not include the Greek wording.  Since the 
communiqué required unanimous approval, the result of the impasse was 
that, for the first time in NATO history, no communiqué of defense 
ministers was issued.  Greece had dramatized its position on the territorial 
issue but at the price of isolating itself further in the NATO council and 
reinforcing the determinations of the NATO secretariat to steer clear of 
Greek-Turkish problems.81 82 
 
All of these effects of the Greek-Turkish dispute on NATO caused the alliance to 
not operate as well it could have.  Due to the problems discussed above its operational 
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readiness and efficiency, especially in the southeastern sector, were far less than they 
should have been.  Many of these problems have been corrected with the approval of the 
1999 new command structure, yet as discussed below even since the Washington Summit 
some problems are still outstanding. 
C. THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON NATO 1999-PRESENT 
 As mentioned above, the completely new NATO military command structure was 
finally approved by the NAC in 1999.83  This new command structure ridded the alliance 
of most of the problems discussed above.  Since then the alliance has as a result been 
operating at better levels of efficiency and readiness.   
The agreement was only reached, though, after many compromises were made, 
especially by Greece and Turkey.  These two countries, while agreeing on the surface 
with the changes, still cling to the claims, deep-rooted beliefs, and suspicions of the other 
that have been with them especially since 1974.  Consequently, while NATO is better off 
than it was before the restructuring, the compromises do nothing more than temporarily 
conceal the two countries true desires, forcing NATO to continue to operate less 
effectively than it should. 
The most recent example is NATOs exercise DESTINED GLORY 2000, the first 
large-scale NATO exercise since the establishment of the new command structure.  
Conducted in Greece and Turkey and in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Seas, its 
two-fold purpose was to demonstrate NATOs capability to provide a flexible response to 
potential crises and to improve NATOs capability to carry out combined (ie: [sic] 
multinational) and joint (ie: [sic] land, air, maritime) operations of an expeditionary 
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nature.84  Many parts of the exercise were a resounding success, but in the end Greece 
still withdrew and Turkey still openly complained about Greeces operations.  The 
dispute centered on whether Greek fighters could fly over Lemnos and Ikaria, which (as 
discussed in Chapter II) Turkey feels should be demilitarized.  When Greek planes did fly 
over them, Turkish fighters tailed them.  After this, and to make matters worse, anti-
aircraft missiles locked on to Turkish planes that flew close to the Greek-controlled part 
of Cyprus.85  Even though both countries were reticent in their criticism of the other, 
these events show that in spite of the improvements of the new command structure, the 
old problems in the southeastern sector continue. 
Another indicator that the new command structure has not solved all of NATOs 
problems in the Aegean is the amount of money that both Greece and Turkey spend on 
their national defense.  Defense resources are finite, and have in fact been shrinking in 
most NATO countries (with the exceptions of Greece and Turkey) since the mid-
1980s.86  Between 1991 and 1994, Greece and Turkey together imported three times as 
many tanks as the British army could field in the event of war.87  This trend continues 
today; in 1998, Greeces defense spending as a percentage of the continents combined 
gross domestic product (GDP) was 4.8 percent and Turkeys was 4.4 percent.  The 
average for a European NATO member was 2.2 percent.88  Additionally, Greece and 
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Turkey were the only European countries over the last two to three years to significantly 
increase the percentage of their national GDP that they spent on defense.89  These figures 
appear to indicate that Greece and Turkey are basically arming to fight one another.  If 
indeed this is the case, then NATO will continue to be negatively affected by the conflict 
well into the immediate future. 
 
In sum, while the new command structure has resolved many of the issues that 
were stalemated over the last two and a half decades by the Greek-Turkish dispute it 
certainly has not solved all of NATOs problems.  The impact of the dispute has been felt 
for the past 26 years and continues to be felt today.  At its best it confounds, confuses, 
and hinders NATO operations; at its worst, in the event of actual hostilities between the 
two allies, it could break up or split the alliance. 
To make matters worse, neither Greece nor Turkey believes that NATO is truly 
impartial; both believe that NATO favors the other.  Greece, on the one hand, believes 
that because of Turkeys strategic importance (bases, numbers of personnel, access to the 
Middle East and Russia, etc.) NATO is partial to Turkey.  Turkey, on the other hand, 
believes that NATO more supports Greece because of Greeces cultural and historical ties 
to Europe and the United States.  Both, therefore, believe that NATO undervalues their 
membership, a situation that is not good for alliance cohesion.90   
Even though the Cold War is over, the importance of the alliance is greater than 
ever.  During the Cold War, bipolarity had three mainstays.  First, the enormous nuclear 
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and conventional force potentials assured both powers of mutually assured destruction 
(MAD), which essentially made war out of the question.  Second, bipolarity spelled 
control; because of MAD, both the United States and the Soviet Union controlled any 
unruly allies so that the superpowers would not be pulled in to a war.  Third, bipolarity 
made for stability within blocs and nations; dependent on the superpower for their 
security, the less-powerful allies took care not to alienate her.91  With the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, these mainstays of bipolarity no longer apply.  In 
todays multipolar (or unipolar) world there is not one single threat - there are many 
threats coming from unknown directions; new security systems are still being designed 
and tested; the more frequent occurrence of non-Article 5 situations has confused the role 
of the alliance; and the lack of one clear aggressor has perhaps decreased NATOs 
readiness (could it even intervene immediately and decisively in the event of war 
between Greece and Turkey?92).  These changes necessitate a strong and prepared NATO 
in the present day and demonstrate the importance it will play into the future. 
NATOs trials and tribulations with the Greek-Turkish dispute over the last 26 
years and the alliances continued importance in todays world are one more reason for 
the disputes immediate resolution.  Many attempts at resolution have been made, with 
few successes.  As discussed in the next chapter, though, this last year has been a time of 
great rapprochement for the two countries.  Perhaps now is the time, for Greece and 
Turkeys sake as well as NATOs, for one giant push toward resolution. 
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 Since the initial confrontations in the early 1970s in the Aegean and on Cyprus, 
many attempts at finding a resolution have been attempted.  These attempts, though, have 
been severely limited and, for the most part, unsuccessful.  Not only do Greece and 
Turkey disagree on many issues in the Aegean Sea, they also disagree on the manner in 
which these issues should be resolved.  Thus, despite recent rapprochement between the 
countries and the recent beginning of accession negotiations of Cyprus into the European 
Union (EU) (which could help to smooth the way ahead), a resolution is far from being 
achieved. 
A.   PREFERED METHOD OF SETTLEMENT 
Greece claims that a legal settlement, such as a ruling of the International Court of 
Justice, is the proper way to come to a solution.  She does not want political negotiations 
as the single way to decide the outcome; she wants international law to be followed in a 
decision handed down by a ruling party.  Greece prefers a legal settlement because her 
claims are based mostly on legally existing documents and treaties and feels that 
politically she would gain the most from such a legal settlement.  She would also most 
likely have to give greater concessions in bilateral negotiations than in a purely legal 
decision.  Furthermore, she is afraid that negotiations would never be able to accomplish 
the task of bringing both sides into agreement on all the issues.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, a decision handed down by an outside arbiter, such as the International 
Court of Justice, would be more acceptable to Greek public opinion than a negotiated 
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decision involving Greek concessions to Turkey.93  This last reason largely is a result of 
national pride, the main obstacle (in both countries) to reaching a solution  a topic that 
will be discussed further in Chapter V. 
Contrary to Greece, Turkey prefers a negotiated settlement achieved out of 
dialogue.  Turkey prefers a negotiated settlement because she is afraid that a decision by 
an outside legal party (such as the ICJ) would not fully appreciate Turkish interests.  
Another large factor is that legally the facts support more Greek claims than Turkish 
claims and do not take into consideration the special and political circumstances of the 
situation.94  Furthermore, Turkey is afraid of a bias against her by an outside party and is 
sure that more favorable terms can be obtained through trade-offs and negotiations.  
Finally, and most importantly once again, the Turkish public would more rapidly accept a 
negotiated settlement due to the greater achievement of its objectives. 
B. PAST INITIATIVES 
Following more Turkish (and Greek) exploration in the Greek-claimed 
continental shelf area after the initial expeditions by the Candarli in 1973, Greece filed 
objections with the UN Security Council on the grounds that Turkeys repeated violations 
of Greek sovereign rights in the Aegean threatened international peace and security.  
Greece also instituted proceedings against Turkey in the International Court of Justice 
seeking interim measures of protection and seeking to determine the continental shelf 
issue.  Neither establishment was able to provide much help.  The UN Security Council 
responded with Resolution 395, adopted on 25 August 1976, which called upon the two 
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countries to do everything in their power to reduce present tension in the area so that the 
negotiating process may be facilitated.  It also called on them to resume direct 
negotiations over their differences and appealed them to do everything within their power 
to ensure that these [negotiations] result in mutually acceptable solutions.  Finally, it 
invited them in this respect to continue to take into account the contribution that 
appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of Justice, were qualified 
to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences which they might identify in 
connection with their present dispute.95   
The ICJ, despite this acknowledgement, ruled on 11 September 1976 and again on 
19 December 1978 that it could not provide interim measures of protection for Greece, 
did not have jurisdiction over the case, and called on the parties to settle the dispute 
through negotiations.  Both rulings basically turned the dispute back to Greece and 
Turkey and were deliberately vague as to allow both parties to support them.  Thus, 
though these rulings diffused the immediate tensions over the continental shelf, the first 
attempts at outside arbitration and/or mediation to reach a permanent solution failed.   
 In the meantime, in 1976 the countries were at least able to come together and 
sign the Berne Declaration.  This Declaration established a code of behavior to govern 
future negotiations on the continental shelf, with a view to preventing future crises and 
reaching an agreement based on mutual consent.96  Despite some questionable actions by 
both countries over the years, the Berne Declaration is still a valid framework today.   
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A late summit meeting in March 1978 in Montreux between the two prime 
ministers (Constantine Karamanlis of Greece and Bulent Ecevit of Turkey) led to little 
other than furthering a climate of mutual confidence.  It did, though, lead to regular (if 
not inconclusive) meetings between the secretaries-general of the two foreign 
ministries.97 
When Turkey rescinded NOTAM 714 in 1980 and normal civil aviation was 
restored in the Aegean, relations temporarily improved.  Turkey followed this by another 
gesture of goodwill, a withdrawal of the insistence that the reincorporation of Greece 
into the military command structure of the NATO alliance, from which she had 
withdrawn in 1974 in the wake of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, should be dependent 
on the negotiation of new operational control responsibilities in the Aegean region for the 
armed forces of the two countries.98  Relations were up and down for the next few years; 
several meetings reached agreements assuring no provocative actions, yet minor incidents 
and disagreements did occasionally cause tensions to flare (for example, the unilateral 
Turkish recognition of an independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and 
the Greek adoption of a new defense doctrine naming its primary threat as not coming 
from the Warsaw Pact but from Turkey). 
Few other major developments occurred until 1987, when a dispute over potential 
oil reserves in the continental shelf just outside Greek territorial waters off the island of 
Samothrace almost led to war.  Turkey had granted further licenses to the Turkish State 
Petroleum Company, and Greece had proposed nationalizing a foreign-owned oil 
consortium that had been exploiting oil in the Aegean.  The Turkish vessel Sismik-I (the 
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same ship which was involved in the 1976 incident), escorted by Turkish warships, even 
set out to conduct research and oil exploration.99  Greece held NATO responsible for the 
crisis and, in a calculated snub, briefed ambassadors of Warsaw Pact countries in Athens 
before their NATO counterparts.100  Both counties eventually withdrew from their 
provocative actions, and meetings between Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in January 
1988 at Davos, Switzerland, diffused the conflict further.  More meetings were held in 
March of that year, and in June the Prime Ministers met in Greece (the first time a 
Turkish Prime Minister had visited Greece in thirty-five years).  Committees were even 
formed to facilitate the discussions and the development of closer relations.  The two 
prime ministers agreed to a more peaceful climate, to the establishment of a hotline 
between the two countries, to meet at least once a year, and to visit each others 
countries. They also called for the intensification of contacts at all levels and for greater 
emphasis on mutual tourism and cultural exchange.101  Meetings such as these continued 
through 1990.  Davos became a symbolic term for a process in which the dispute 
between the Turks and the Greeks had, for the first time, been taken up over an extended 
period.102  This atmosphere of cooperation and mutual trust became known as the Spirit 
of Davos and is now the attitude that is desired (and needed) by both sides if an 
agreement is to be garnered.   
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The Davos process broke down, though, in 1990.  It can be studied as a typical 
example of all of the attempts at resolution between Turkey and Greece since 1973 (all 
other attempts at resolution over the years broke down in similar fashions).  Initially 
Davos promised some major successes, but as talks proceeded the rifts that had brought 
them to the table kept them from reaching solutions.  Both sides continued to accuse the 
other of Aegean violations.  Neither side would give in on any of the major issues  they 
were both determined to see the disputes resolved without making any concessions.  They 
also continued to disagree on how to resolve the disputes (ICJ versus negotiations) and on 
what issues should be discussed at what times and in relation to which other issues.  For 
example, at Davos Greece set a precondition to any meaningful talks: that Turkish troops 
must either withdraw unconditionally from Cyprus or that a meaningful gesture should be 
made. 
This gesture had to be made prior to a solution of the Cyprus problem and 
before any dialogue would be entertained.  This implied that the Greeks 
demanded that a solution to the Cyprus problem be found before an 
agreement could be reached on any other outstanding bilateral issues or a 
programme of economic cooperation.  For the Turks, making such a 
gesture meant that they accepted the view that the Greeks were right, and 
they were wrong.  Furthermore, it was not certain whether the Greeks, 
once having acknowledged this gesture, would then request further 
gestures with respect to other problems.103 
 
These kinds of problems are typical of those that dominated the Greek/Turkish resolution 
process in the 1970s and 1980s.  Many attempts were made, but the unsuccessful efforts 
were stymied by national pride while the successful endeavors accomplished nothing 
substantial.  Though the Spirit of Davos was still desired by both sides the old sources of 
friction continued to upstage the hope for resolution in the 1990s.   
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 Finally, the United States (and other third parties such as the UN, the EU, and 
NATO) has been intimately involved in trying to bring the two countries into accord.  
Though U.S. efforts have not always been appreciated by both sides, higher levels of 
conflict were most likely avoided because of these third party interventions.  The 
Imia/Kardak crisis, for example, did not escalate to fighting because of the intervention 
of U.S. personnel and initiatives.  Other methods of limiting escalation of possible minor 
incidents into full-scale war (such as a shooting incident) are also in place: the 
multinational peacekeeping force in Cyprus, UNFICYP, for example, has helped to limit 
confrontations.  Though no similar force exists in the Aegean, the UN and NATO have 
attempted to implement several preventative measures to try to quell any uprising.  Hot 
lines, transparency of military exercises, and implementation of confidence building 
measures are UN and NATO mechanisms that, while not optimal, have attempted to help 
Greece and Turkey avoid military confrontation.104  Also, top-level diplomats are 
assigned to the region that offer their services and opinions with a view towards reaching 
a solution.  These are just a few of the ways in which the United States has tried to broker 
peace in the region. 
 The United States has in fact pursued three main peacekeeping/peacemaking 
tracks over the years.  The first has been operational prevention, measures to avoid 
violence by monitoring to ensure early warning and early response, the use of preventive 
diplomacy, and a readiness to consider use of sanctions and/or military force.105  The 
second track has been to keep the peacemaking process alive, even if only by a thread, in 
order to reduce tensions.  And the third main track has been support for longer-term 
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structural prevention to build understanding, promote public debate, and create 
incentives through trade and other forms of mutually beneficial cooperation.106  All in 
all, U.S. efforts over the years have succeeded in preventing serious outbreaks of violence 
but have not accomplished the long-term goal of peace. 
C. RECENT INITIATIVES 
While both countries are still deeply suspicious of the other and accuse the other 
of greed, aggressiveness, threats, and aims on the others sovereignty, very recent 
initiatives from both countries (especially in the late 1990s) seem to have somewhat 
ameliorated relations between the two countries.  First, similar to the results of Berne, 
both countries have put forth multiple unilateral goodwill proposals and initiatives 
expressing ideas how to acquire a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  Too numerous to 
cite directly here, these proposals discuss codes of peaceful conduct for both countries as 
well as their desire and willingness to resolve the conflicts.  When combined with real 
positive action from both sides they may help to make a difference.   
In addition, many confidence building measures have been agreed upon.  These 
include reducing the number of military exercises of the two countries, opening direct 
lines of communication between their chiefs of general staff, exchanges of visits of ports, 
joint maneuvers, and coast guard and military aircraft flying unarmed over sensitive 
areas.107 108  These confidence building measures may be the first tentative but necessary 
steps to more trust and consequently bigger and more comprehensive agreements. 
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Also, a bilateral meeting (hosted by the United States) between Turkish President 
Demirel and Greek Prime Minister Simitis in 1997 led to the Madrid Joint Declaration.  
This Declaration stresses the mutual desire of both countries to peacefully settle their 
differences, sums up the principles and mechanisms by which the countries will 
peacefully settle their differences, and expresses the commitment of both parties to 
respect the sovereignty of the other.109  Once again, it is a declaration that, when not 
betrayed by one or the other country and where national pride does not get in the way, 
could lead to meaningful progress down the road if further steps are pursued.  It is, 
though, just one more declaration in a string of similar declarations that discusses the 
mechanisms for dialogue toward a solution but does not get down to solving the real 
problems. 
Moreover, from 1993 to 1995 and again in 1999 Greece and Turkey were 
involved in bilateral discussions that included trade, economic issues, tourism, culture, 
the environment, illegal immigration, crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.  These led to 
the signing of nine agreements on bilateral cooperation, raising hopes that some of the 
more contentious issues may be resolved next.110  In addition, increased contact between 
private businessmen from both sides has shown the possibilities and benefits of expanded 
economic cooperation.  These interactions show that relations have improved and also 
show that both countries understand that they are in an important part of the world where 
they must cooperate if either is to have great influence on events and security in their 
region.   
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Finally, the earthquakes in Turkey in August 1999 and Athens in September 1999 
caused an unprecedented wave of popular support for earthquake victims both in Greece 
and Turkey.  Both countries, either through official channels or through private initiative, 
rallied to the side of each other dispatching medical supplies, equipment and rescue teams 
to alleviate the plight of earthquake-torn Greeks and Turks.111  These natural disasters 
brought at least some temporary changes in public opinion.  Greek and Turkish 
politicians and citizens have seen that the other side may not necessarily be our natural 
enemy, and relations have consequently warmed to the point that the two countries even 
decided to submit a joint bid to host the 2008 European Soccer Championship and agreed 
to organize a youth exchange program between the two countries.112  Even the press is 
talking of cooperation and not taking the historic hard line.  The earthquakes have thus 
ironically helped improve relations and have helped to perhaps bring about the undreamt-
of opportunity for further rapprochement.113   
In sum, the resolution progress between Turkey and Greece is a cat and mouse 
game, marked by proposals, retreats, collaboration, misunderstanding, stagnation, threats, 
and vanity. In the past few years, both countries have started using rhetoric stating the 
desirability of reaching peaceful solution, of carrying out confidence building measures 
based on mutual respect and with a willingness to reach a compromise, and of expecting 
the other side to adopt the same attitudes.  Despite these friendly declarations, though, 
their actions many times betray these statements.   
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The basic issues in the Aegean and Cyprus have yet to be resolved, but relations 
between Turkey and Greece have improved, especially in the last year.  Infrequent events 
such as the Imia/Kardak crisis still show the escalatory nature of their relationship, but at 
the same time it is clear that both sides will almost certainly always stop short of the act 
of war; the risks are too great, the potential rewards to little, and the outcomes too 
uncertain.  Both governments have some common sense in this regard and they must now 
use that common sense to move toward resolution of the overall problem.  How to move 
toward that resolution is the question; many possibilities exist but some options and 
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A. THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO RESOLUTION: NATIONALISM 
Since 1974 the Greek-Turkish dispute has cost both countries politically and 
economically, has been a detriment to NATO and other organizations, and even worse 
has cost some lives.  Many attempts have been made to solve the complex issues, of 
airspace control to territorial waters, of full sovereignty rights of the Aegean islands to 
the Cyprus case.  The main reason that all of these attempts failed, though, was that 
neither side could get over her sense of national pride and mistrust of the other country.  
These psychological barriers are the real reasons that no progress was made at the Davos 
meeting in 1988, are the reasons that basically no progress has been made since 1974, 
and are still the main factors impeding Turkey and Greeces resolution process today.  
For, although the basis of some of the major disagreements in the Aegean are found in 
relatively new concepts such as sovereign rights over the continental shelf and conflicting 
interpretations of recently developed international laws, [one] will recognize that at the 
heart of many of these issues is the perennial problem of mistrust: fear that one would 
alter the strategic balance or gain vital resources at the others expense.114   
Over the centuries of conflict between the two countries, the strong nationalism 
has understandably developed from this mistrust of the other.  Territorial disagreements 
are at the heart of these nationalistic feelings, but differences in religion, culture, 
personality, and ethnic makeup add heat to this fire.115  Much of the public in both 
countries displays this nationalism, pride, and at times ingrained animosity toward the 
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other side.  These pressures from proud domestic publics are fanned by nationalistic 
rhetoric from each national media and consequently influence the politicians who are 
responsible for the resolution process.  As a result the politicians find it difficult to 
overcome these pressures domestically, even if they want to, because they need public 
political support to remain in power.  But in fact more often than not the politicians are 
themselves nationalistic, cannot overcome the psychological barriers, and therefore do 
not make the concessions necessary for reaching a solution.  Proposals are made that look 
as if they will help, but in reality they are simply mini-steps that appeal more to the 
domestic public, press, and even Western governments than really attempt to aid the 
conflict.116  Neither side is definitely willing to give in and each often retreats from 
proposals.  The positive statements indicating a desire to work together seem to be 
consistently overcome by the domestic nationalistic pressures and strong proud 
governments.  Plus, since the resolution process is taking so long, new domestic regimes 
come into power at various time in both countries and adopt new policies and attitudes, 
halting any progress that may have been made.   
This nationalism was the main reason the Davos meeting broke down and is still 
the reason no major progress has been made.  Some national pride is always desirable 
within a nation,117 but in todays post-Cold War world, where most of Europe is at peace 
and both Greece and Turkey are prospering, there is little reason to maintain the feelings 
of mistrust toward the other side.   Rational analysis of the facts of the dispute indicates 
that Greece is not at all likely to make the Aegean into a mare Graecum or starting 
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point for an invasion of Turkey.  Likewise, rational analysis indicates that Turkey is not 
at all likely to use its 4th Army to take back the Aegean islands.  A shift in mentality and 
behavior from both sides, as France and Germany underwent in the second half of the 
20th century, is therefore required if a solution is ever to be reached. 
B. PROSPECTS FOR RESOLUTION 
Despite the centuries of conflict between Greece and Turkey, the dispute in the 
Aegean Sea is a fairly recent one, but one that still must be resolved for many reasons.  
Most obviously, resolution would settle the question of what activities are and are not 
allowed by each country and where, minimizing the possibility of hostilities between 
Greece and Turkey in the Aegean.  In addition, resolution would bring more political, 
military, and social stability and security to the region and, therefore, to NATO and the 
EU.  Both countries would gain more political respectability and clout than they have 
right now and would improve their national prestige.  Both Greece and Turkey would 
enjoy greatly increased economic opportunities, from resources in the continental shelf to 
greater numbers of tourists and business partnerships.  Resolution would provide 
undisputed passage through the Aegean to and from the Black Sea for all countries 
vessels.  NATO would be able to make its crisis management planning and associated 
measures more effective and efficient and could start looking at the Aegean as a strong 
point in its common security and stability architecture rather than Greek or Turkish weak 
points to be defended by each country.  Both countries could also cut back on the 
inordinate amount of money that they currently spend on national defense, relative to 
other European countries, due to the threat from the other side.  Resolution would give 
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more legitimacy to UNCLOS III and further its worldwide adoption as the only true 
maritime regime.  Finally, Greeks and Turks (and in fact Americans, who place great 
strategic importance on this region and who have spent a great deal of time and money 
trying to prevent violence and to resolve the disputes)118 could live more easily knowing 
that the threat of war is once and for all past. 
It is generally accepted that the dispute will not boil into hot war119; though 
theyve been at the brink of war many times, for example in 1987 over the oil reserves 
(see Chapter IV, section B) and 1996 over Imia/Kardak (see Chapter II, section E), at 
least until now both countries always stop short.  Among the reasons for Greece is that 
she is a much weaker power militarily.  Among those for Turkey is that she would be 
fighting against the UN if she aligned herself with the TRNC versus Greece and the 
Republic of Cyprus, a damaging move both militarily and diplomatically.  War would 
benefit neither and hurt both.  But both also claim that they are ready to fight, and it 
seems that if absolutely necessary they indeed would.  Incidents still occur every few 
months in the Aegean that hold the potential to escalate the dispute into conflict: both 
countries still openly accuse the other of not doing enough to help solve the dispute120, 
harassments in the air still occur frequently121, and infrequent events such as the Abdullah 
Öcalan case (where Turkey accused Greece of harboring the Kurdistan Workers Party 
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(PKK) leader and terrorist who had been Turkeys greatest domestic enemy122) do 
nothing but hurt.  Hopefully these kinds of incidents will not cause the two countries to 
do anything rash militarily, but the simple fact that the word hopefully must be used in 
a sentence such as this is further proof that the dispute must be settled.   
Despite the ever-present potential for armed conflict, the time is currently ripe for 
a serious resolution process to begin.  The earthquakes of 1999 set not only the populace 
but even the politicians and media in a more amicable state of mind.  The other recent 
initiatives discussed in Chapter IV augment this state of mind.  As another example of 
recent rapprochement, Turkey landed 150 marines and a squadron of F-16 aircraft in 
Greece during NATOs operation DYNAMIC MIX 2000, neither of which had happened 
since 1974.123  Turkish ADM (Ret) Govan Erkaya, former Chief of Naval Operations and 
advisor to the Prime Minister, even suggested to his peers pulling back the Turkish 4th 
Army.124  In addition, and most encouragingly, the current Greek Foreign Minister 
George Papandreou is pro-resolution and not at all nationalistic like his father, former 
Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou.  Papandreou is supported by the Greek Prime 
Minister Constas Simitis, and the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit is also as 
moderate as there has been in quite some time.125  The two countries must make the most 
of the coincidence of these congruous governments.  All told, both countries appear to be 
                                                 
122 Turkey, Greece sign accords, seal new era in relations, Agence France Presse, 20 January 2000. 
123 New Horizons in Turkish-Greek Relations.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.  [HTTP] Available: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/adeb/01.htm [18 September 2000]. 
124 Discussion between a Turkish naval officer and the author at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, on 
7 December 2000. 
125 Can Greeks love Turks? Janes Information Group Limited, Foreign Report, 11 November 1999. 
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ready for a peace process126 and have put forth many recent unilateral and bilateral 
initiatives and plans stating their readiness and willingness.   
Considering the huge complexity of the different, somewhat interwoven problems 
and issues as well as the prolonged history of conflict that must be considered in a 
resolution, it is obvious that a comprehensive solution is and will be difficult to attain.  In 
light of the recent warming of relations and the current opportunity for resolution, 
though, a few general additional comments on the prospects for resolution are definitely 
within this thesiss scope and are factors that must be considered by one working on an 
actual resolution proposal.   
The resolution process can certainly be helped by Turkeys current bid to join the 
EU.  Prior to 1999 Greece, EU member since 1981, was opposed to Turkeys bid to join 
the EU and sometimes, much to Turkish fury, even used a veto of Turkeys potential 
membership as a bargaining chip to try to favorably resolve certain aspects of the 
Greek-Turkish dispute.  Other events, such as the discord brought by the Luxembourg 
Summit in 1997 and the debate, still ongoing, over how the accession of Cyprus should 
proceed in light of the Greek-Turkish dispute, increased tensions between Turkey, 
Greece, and the EU even more.  Greece finally realized, though, that prospective Turkish 
membership would not only benefit Turkey but would as well benefit Greece politically 
and economically.  Greece also understood that withdrawal of her opposition would help 
to integrate Greece more fully into the EU, from which she had been semi-isolated 
politically due to her stubbornness over the Greek-Turkish dispute.127  Helped by the 
                                                 
126 Turkeys Aegean Peace Process Initiative.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.  [HTTP] Available: 
www.mfa.gov.tr/gfupa/ad/ade/adec/Peace1.htm [18 September 2000]. 
127 Can Greeks love Turks? Janes Information Group Limited, Foreign Report, 11 November 1999. 
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amelioration of relations after 1999, Greece formally withdrew her opposition to the 
Turkish membership application at the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999, and 
Turkey was accepted as a formal candidate for membership. 
Turkey has a long road ahead before she will be eventually accepted as a full EU 
member, but this road to acceptance will act in a cyclic relationship with the Aegean 
dispute: the more that Greece and Turkey attempt to solve their dispute, the better 
Turkeys chances are of completely complying with membership conditions and therefore 
being accepted as a member of the EU.  Likewise, the closer that Turkey gets to 
becoming a member of the EU, the more that the EU will help solve the Aegean dispute.   
On the one hand, one of the requirements for EU membership is resolution of 
outstanding conflicts with other member-states.128  The European Council recalls that 
strengthening Turkeys links with the European Union also depends on  the 
establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the 
settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of 
Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in 
Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.129  Obviously, the 
unresolved Aegean dispute still is one of the most detrimental obstacles for Turkeys way 
to Brussels. 
On the other hand, the closer Turkey comes to becoming an EU member, the 
easier it will (should) be to resolve the Aegean dispute.  EU members, in theory at least, 
are very similar countries; they have similar economies, similar governments, similar 
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74 
values and cultures, etc., or are trying to assimilate all of these.  Even the internal 
borders, though formally existent, are not any longer dividing lines due to the 
Schengen Agreement.  Promoting cooperation and lessening hostility are high goals of 
the EU, and the EU will work hard to try to help an amicable resolution to the conflict 
come about.130  [A]bsorbing a conflicted or disaggregated state into the larger European 
Union can defuse conflict by Europeanizing it.131  The EU, in fact, set 2004 as the 
deadline when the EU would examine the disputes with a view to sending them to the 
International Court of Justice.132   
It is not definite that the presence of the EU will help in the resolution process; for 
example, Turkey has suggested in the past that it may stall NATO enlargement if it fails 
to receive better treatment from the EU.133  But in spite of these uncertainties, 
[i]ntegration has a security aspect; security has an integration aspect.134  This is the 
cyclic relationship between the Aegean dispute and Turkeys bid to join the EU that, in 
spite of the many obstacles faced by the EU, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus in the past, 
present, and future, could help to bring about the disputes resolution. 
Another reason for optimism about the prospects for resolution of the Aegean 
dispute is that the dispute is also currently, due to the strategic importance of Greece, 
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Turkey, and the Aegean, a high priority for the United States, a situation that should do 
nothing but help the resolution process. 
Tensions on Cyprus, Greek-Turkish disagreements in the Aegean and 
Turkeys relationship with the EU have serious implications for regional 
stability and the evolution of European political and security structures.  
Our goals are to stabilize the region by reducing long-standing Greek-
Turkish tensions and pursuing a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus.135 
 
The United States has the potential, as seen during the Imia/Kardak incident, to help 
achieve a solution that the two sides could not reach by themselves.  The United States 
has the military power to back both countries (in the event, say, of a treaty of non-
aggression between Greece and Turkey calling for the mutual withdrawal of their troops) 
and the political leverage to push them to get things done.  Though she has been 
unsuccessful over the years at brokering a long-term solution and though she must strive 
not to push so hard as to alienate either Greece or Turkey, continued proactive effort from 
U.S. diplomats will help all involved.  After all, the American voice and support at least 
command attention. 
The prospects for resolution are thus currently promising.  Several observations 
about the resolution process are therefore appropriate.  First, a fair solution that considers 
the special circumstances of the Aegean Sea should be attained in the spirit not only of 
Greece and Turkeys national interests but also international law as set forth in numerous 
international treaties, resolutions, agreements, and maps.  The spirit and intent of 
UNCLOS III, for example, should be of utmost importance (with an eventual goal of 
Turkey acceding to this international regime).  The real problem is that many of these 
legal documents and countless maps are old, outdated, and contradictory.  Thus the 
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Aegean dispute is not at all a dispute over true sovereignty; it is a dispute over the 
interpretation of these documents.  A good place to start, therefore, would be to update, 
or at least align, these many documents. 
Second, all of the topics discussed in Chapter II need to be settled within a 
comprehensive framework because they are linked, and a solution to one directly affects 
another.  The issue of territorial waters, for example, cannot be solved without affecting 
and being affected by the continental shelf dispute.  Also, the concessions that each side 
will need, to some degree, to make in order to reach a resolution will connect the various 
issues together: for example, Greece could openly agree not to exercise  now or ever  
her right under UNCLOS III to extend her territorial seas to 12 miles (a right that she will 
obviously never exercise) in exchange for Turkey rescinding her demand that Greece 
demilitarize the eastern Aegean islands (which really do not pose any threat to Turkey). 
Third, as most EU countries are also NATO countries136, their security concerns 
normally overlap.  Because of its relationship to the EU and the problems that the dispute 
has caused it, NATO  in cooperation with the EU - should be playing a much larger 
active role, backed by the United States, in trying to resolve the dispute.  A more active 
role would show both countries that NATO does in fact not favor the other (as they 
believe) but indeed cares that this dispute be resolved.  It would provide the two countries 
with a powerful third party presence that would push the countries more forcefully 
toward resolution and also keep potential conflicts from flashing into any armed fighting.  
This effort from a neutral NATO might consequently elicit more individual effort from 
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Greece and Turkey to move more steadily towards resolution initiatives on their own.  
What is evident is that a third party, no matter who that party is, will be mandatory to 
help resolve this dispute; Greece and Turkey are not currently capable of solving it on 
their own, and a third party, whether NATO, the EU, the ICJ, the United States, or the 
UN, can provide the neutrality, pressure, and military and political support that can crack 
the deadlock, get through both sides nationalism, and help to broker a solution. 
When national pride interprets flexibility as weakness and tradeoffs as 
capitulations, a third party can sometimes assume enough of the political 
risk to enable the disputants to reach a settlement that serves their longer-
term interests.  In assuming the risk itself, the third party may of course 
endanger its own interests by alienating one or both of the parties directly 
involved.  This is why NATO has been so reticent about Greek-Turkish 
differences in recent years.  But there are also risks in reticence, and one 
of them is that an inherently unstable status quo will explode into violence 
that no one wants but no one has done much to prevent.137 
 
C.  CONCLUSION 
Greece and Turkey are far from agreeing on a solution to the dispute, much less a 
process to get to a solution.  But the time may now be right to proceed with a resolution 
process.  The earthquakes, which brought great disaster, also brought the unforeseen and 
fortunate amelioration of relations.  The current governments of Greece and Turkey are 
also much more open to rapprochement than in the past.  Three general factors have over 
the years affected conflict resolution: domestic government stability, powerful and 
innovative principal decision makers in both countries, and constructive external 
influences (i.e., third parties).138  These three factors can now for the first time in 25 years 
be satisfied in the Aegean dispute.  This window of opportunity, though, might be open 
for only a short time, and if Greece, Turkey, and potential third parties do not take 
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advantage of this occasion it may be years before such an opportunity again presents 
itself.   
Combining the improved relations with real effort to follow through with such 
agreements like the Berne Declaration, the Davos meeting, and the Madrid Joint 
Declaration could lead to real progress.  Both countries, though, need to stop only talking 
about improving relations; they need to actually take action towards solutions.  They also 
need to stop playing their political games, such as urging the other side to finally get 
serious about resolving the conflict, and make bilateral concessions in the name of a more 
peaceful and prosperous situation.  The confidence building measures of the past couple 
years are a great starting point and help to start building mutual trust.  The mutual 
politico-economic gains of an ensuing resolution vastly outweigh the individual politico-
military desires of deadlock.  Once again, involvement and active engagement of a third 
party can provide the impartiality, pressure, and backing to make this happen. 
Many obstacles to reconciliation still exist and must be overcome.  Both countries 
believe that the current state of festering conflict is generally acceptable because it 
preserves the interests that both countries call vital.  Both countries believe that their 
current approach and stance is viable.  There is a lack of Greek and Turkish confidence 
that the approach proposed by the other side would lead to fair and equitable results.  And 
more importantly, the pervasive mistrust and deep sense of nationalism persist.139  Greece 
and Turkey must both try harder to overcome these disincentives; peace, stability, and 
common security would benefit them both.  No major new clever formulas are needed; 
far more important are the willingness and final desire to work together and compromise 
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in order to get a mutually beneficial solution.  The issues in this case are complex and the 
factors to consider, including not only territorial claims but also nationalism and 
ethnicity, are many.  But if in fact they can be jolted off the pedestals on which they 
have stood for so long with such absolute moral certainty,140 then perhaps a resolution 
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